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Notes
DRUG TESTING HIGH SCHOOL AND JUNIOR
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AFTER
VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. A CTON:
PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR
SCHOOL DISTRICTS
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to
experience the power of government. Through it passes
every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to
policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there,
they take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals
is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the
government may not intrude on the personal privacy of its
citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance.,
I. INTRODUCTION
Benji Ramirez's life threatening behavior could have been detected, and
possibly even prevented, before it caused his death.2 His coach should have
known.' His friends and teammates knew, yet no one spoke out until after he
collapsed during football practice and subsequently died later the same evening
from an apparent heart attack.' Benji was a seventeen-year-old high school
senior who just three days before his tragic death had played the game of his life
for the Ashtabula High School football team.5 His sudden death raised a
perplexing question: How could a strong, healthy, six foot three inch tall, 201
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385-86 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
2. Rick Telander & Merrell Noden, The Death of an Athlete, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 20,
1989, at 68, 70.
3. Id. at 75. Many people in the community believed that Benji's coach was the bad guy who
should have recognized Benji's steroid problem and addressed it. Id. Part of the admitted problem
is that coaches do not receive adequate training to identify the signs of steroid use. Id.
4. Id. at 70.
5. Id. Benji's tragic death illustrates the misperception that drug abuse is only a problem in
large metropolitan areas: Ashtabula is a Midwestern town with a population of 24,000 located in
the State of Ohio. Id. at 71.
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pound high school football star just collapse and die on the practice field?6 The
answer came shortly after Benji's death when friends revealed to school officials
that Benji had been using anabolic steroids.7 An autopsy report indicating that
Benji's use of steroids was a contributing factor to his death confirmed the
friends' statements!8
Benji's death created a sense of urgency in the Ashtabula community to take
measures to prevent further drug related fatalities.9 The community responded
by forming a substance abuse committee to make plans to deter drug use among
students in the area schools.'" The committee discussed implementing
comprehensive drug education programs for the general student population, and
also drug testing procedures for student athletes." This has been the
institutional response across the country by school districts that have seen, or
perceived, a rise in drug use among their students. 2 As school officials fear
6. At first Benji's death seemed to defy explanation because the practice had not been strenuous,
the weather was not hot, and Benji appeared to be strong and fit. Id. at 70.
7. Id. at 70-71. Benji's steroid use was no secret: His nickname was "Roids." Id. at 76.
Friends had seen him buy and even inject himself with steroids. Id. at 75-76. His football coach
had questioned him upon hearing rumors that he was using steroids, which he denied. Id. at 76.
See generally RICHARD H. STRAUSS, DRUGS & PERFORMANCE IN SPORTS 59-60 (1987)
(describing patterns of use of anabolic steroids among athletes). Anabolic steroids were first used
in sports, such as weight lifting, that required great strength or muscle size. Id. at 59. However,
the use of anabolic steroids has crept into many sports, including sprint and distance running,
wrestling, and swimming. Id. at 60. Both female and male athletes use anabolic steroids. Id. "In
the United States, anabolic steroids are used by some athletes, including football players, at the
professional, college, and high-school levels, and even occasionally by high-school girl runners."
Id.
8. Telander & Noden, supra note 2, at 71. County Coroner Dr. Robert A. Malinowski
explained that while a coroner's report does not always produce incontrovertible facts, his opinion
was that Benji's steroid use was a contributing factor in his death. Id. If Dr. Malinowski's opinion
was correct, then Benji was the first American athlete whose death had been officially linked to
steroid use. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. "Drug use is widespread among American schoolchildren." U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., WHAT
WORKS: SCHOOLS WITHOUT DRUGS 5 (1992) [hereinafter WHAT WORKS]. While a 1991 study
shows that drug use among young people has declined, "[t]he United States continues to have the
highest rate of teenage drug use of any nation in the industrialized world." Id. The results from
the 1991 national study of high school seniors illustrate the gravity of the drug problem among
America's youth:
Forty-four percent of high school seniors have tried an illicit drug by the time they
graduate. Alcohol is the most widely used drug. By their senior year, 88 percent of
students in the class of 1991 had used alcohol; 78 percent had used alcohol in the past
year and 54 percent had used it in the month prior to the survey. Thirty percent of
seniors surveyed reported at least one occasion of heavy drinking in the two weeks prior
to the survey-an occasion in which they had five or more drinks in a row. Twenty-
four percent of 1991 seniors reported using marijuana in the past year, and 14 percent
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that drug use is reaching epidemic levels, submitting to mandatory drug testing
has become a more common condition placed upon eligibility requirements for
interscholastic sports participation. 3
If Benji attended high school today the drug use that lead to his death might
have been prevented. This is because the United States Supreme Court recently
decided that schools may drug test student athletes. 4 This much is certain.
However, if Benji was not a member of the football team, his drug use probably
would have gone undetected. This is because the Supreme Court's recent
decision does not clearly articulate whether other segments of the public school
student body, outside of the context of athletics, may be tested.
said they had used it at least once in the previous month. Three and one-half percent
of seniors indicated that they had used cocaine in the past year. Three percent of
seniors had used crack, and 1.5 percent had used it within the last year.
Id.
Numerous articles and studies have also documented the prevalence of drug use among
students. Ellen Flax, 250,000 Teenagers Have Used Steroids, Number May be Growing, Studies
Find, EDUC. WK., Sept. 19, 1990, at 6; Lynn M. Jackson, Schools Fight Steroids Grip on Students,
USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 1990, at 2C. See generally JERALD G. BACHMAN ET AL., NATIONAL
TRENDS IN DRUG USE AND RELATED FACTORS AMONG AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, 1975-
1986 (1987) (reporting trends in drug use and attitudes of high school seniors based on an annual
survey conducted since 1975). But see Jessica Portner, Study Showing Rise in Drug Use Called Into
Question, EDUC. WK., Oct. 28, 1992, at 8.
13. See, eg., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (requiring drug testing
as an eligibility requirement for participation in interscholastic athletics); Schaill v. Tippecanoe
County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 69, 863 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1994) (same); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (same); Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D.
Ark. 1985) (same); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709 (N.J.
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (same). However, the National Federation of State High School
Associations estimates that less than one percent of the 16,000 public high schools in the United
States test their students for drug use. Tanya Bricking, High SchoolDrug-Testing Debate Rages On,
USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 1995, at IC. This figure appears to be on the rise. According to John
Heeney, assistant to the director for the National Federation of State High School Associations, less
than five percent (an increase from the less than one percent reported in 1995) of all high schools
in the country have any kind of drug testing, voluntary or mandatory, for athletes. Steve Moore,
Parents Clash Over Issue of Drug Tests: A Committee Is to Study the Issue of Mandatory Random
Testing of Athletes, PRESS ENTERPRISE, Feb. 21, 1997, at BI.
14. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2386. The Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of high
school and junior high school student athletes as an eligibility requirement to participate on an
interscholastic sports team. Id. See infra notes 294-361 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Acton case.
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Drug use among American youth, whether the substance is anabolic steroids
or recreational drugs, creates many problems in the public schools 5 and
society as a whole.16 While these concerns merit individual attention, this Note
will discuss the problem of drug use among student athletes to determine
whether drug testing programs in public schools may be extended outside the
15. One of the educational costs of substance abuse is high drop out rates for students using
drugs compared to students that do not use drugs. Drug Use, Negative Outcomes Linked in Dropout
Study, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WK., Aug. 21, 1995, at 2 (explaining that drug use is a good
predictor of school drop out patterns). The study surveyed a group of 1243 adolescent dropouts in
California. Id. Reports indicated that 29.5 % of the dropouts tried an illegal drug by the age of
twelve, compared to only 8.3% of students that age still in school. Id. The dropouts' weekly rates
of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine use were two, five, and ten times the rates of use by students
attending school. Id. The United States Department of Education has also documented the
correlation between drop out rates and drug use. WHAT WORKS, supra note 12, at 11. "In a
Philadelphia study, dropouts were almost twice as likely to be frequent drug users as were high
school graduates; four in five dropouts used drugs regularly." Id.
Student drug use is also closely tied to truancy. Id. "High school seniors who are heavy drug
users are more than three times as likely to skip school as nonusers." Id. "About one-fifth of heavy
users skipped three or more school days a month, more than six times the truancy rate of nonusers."
Id. In the classroom, student drug use adversely affects the learning process. Id. This is because
adolescent drug use threatens normal cognitive development in a number of ways:
Drugs can interfere with memory, sensation, and perception. They distort experiences
and cause a loss of self-control that can lead users to harm themselves and others.
Drugs interfere with the brain's ability to take in, sort, and synthesize information. As
a result, sensory information runs together, providing new sensations while blocking
normal ability to understand the information received. Drugs can have an insidious
effect on perception; for example, cocaine and amphetamines often give users a false
sense of functioning at their best while on the drug.
Id. at 9.
Drug use erodes children's self-discipline and motivation which is essential for learning. Id.
at 11. Research has shown that student drug use can cause a decline in academic performance. Id.
"This has been found to be true for students who excelled in school prior to drug use as well as for
those with academic or behavioral problems prior to use." Id. "According to one study, students
using marijuana were twice as likely to average D's and F's as other students." Id. Negative
academic school performance due to drug use is not permanent; "[tihe decline in grades often
reverses when drug use is stopped." Id.
16. A strong correlation between drug use and juvenile delinquency is documented in a recent
study sponsored by the United States Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention. Stuart Greenbaum, Drugs, Delinquency, and Other Data, JUVENILE
JUSTICE, Spring/Summer 1994, at 2. The Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of
Juvenile Delinquency drew on data from three projects that studied some 4000 youths over a five
year period. Id. The study documented a strong correlation between criminal behavior and the use
of drugs. Id. at 3. The study found that the more involvement a youth had with drugs, the more
likely that youth was involved in delinquency. Id. The study revealed even more alarming data that
substance abuse began at a young age. Id. The findings that by age 16 one-half of the youths
studied were using alcohol on a regular basis, and about 25% were using marijuana, prompted the
researchers to recommend that prevention programs begin as early as elementary school. Id. at 3,
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context of interscholastic sports. 7
The introduction of mandatory drug testing in public schools has not gained
acceptance silently; instead, controversy, opposition, and protest surround the
issue.'8  For example, students and their parents have brought lawsuits
17. The Supreme Court recently held that public schools may require student athletes to submit
to mandatory, random, suspicionless drug tests as a condition to being eligible to participate in
interscholastic athletics. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). For a
discussion of the Acton case, see infra notes 294-361 and accompanying text.
18. An exchange of academic discourse between Eugene A. Lincoln and Jeffrey T. Sultanik
illustrates the controversy surrounding the issue of mandatory drug testing in public schools. Mr.
Lincoln argues that drug testing students cannot satisfy the constitutional standard for searches in
public schools set out in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Eugene A. Lincoln,
Mandatory Urine Testing for Drugs in Public Schools and the Fourth Amendment: Some Thoughts
for School Officials, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 181, 187-88 (1989). The T.L.O. standard requires a search
in public schools to first be justified at its inception, and second to be reasonably related in its scope
to the circumstances which justified the search in the first place. Id. at 181-82. Mr. Lincoln offers
three hypothetical situations in which he concludes that drug testing in public schools is
unconstitutional. Id. at 183-87.
Even in the first hypothetical, which describes a situation where a teacher observes students
smoking marijuana on school premises, Mr. Lincoln asserts that drug testing is unconstitutional.
Id. at 183-85. Mr. Lincoln argues that testing the students a teacher observed using drugs may
satisfy the first prong of the T.L.O. standard; however, the second prong cannot be satisfied. Id.
at 185. The second prong of the T.L.O. standard requires that a search be reasonable in its scope.
Id. at 184. "That is, the measures adopted for the search must: (1) Be reasonably related to the
objectives of the search; and (2) Not be excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction." Id. The crux of Mr. Lincoln's argument that student drug
testing fails the second prong of the T.L.O. school search standard is that the Enzyme Multiplied
Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) of drug testing does not measure current impairment. Id. at 184-
85. Because the objective of testing in public schools, in the hypothetical, was to determine whether
a student was under the influence of drugs while at school, EMIT drug testing is not reasonably
related to the stated objective. Id. at 185. Mr. Lincoln also concludes that the second prong is not
met because the procedures surrounding drug testing are excessively intrusive. Id.
Jeffrey T. Sultanik offers a response to Mr. Lincoln's article by setting out two hypothetical
situations in which he concludes that drug testing in public schools is constitutional, and by
presenting a number of factors that should be incorporated into a drug testing program. Jeffrey T.
Sultanik, Counterpoint: A Case For Mandatory Urine Testing For Drugs in Public Schools, 19 J.L.
& EDUC. 387, 387-94 (1990). The first hypothetical situation is similar to Mr. Lincoln's
hypothetical based on teachers' observations of student drug use on school premises. Id. at 388-89.
However, Mr. Sultanik discredits Mr. Lincoln's argument that drug testing is unconstitutional due
to the shortcomings of the EMIT drug testing procedure by suggesting that the Gas
Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) method of testing be used. Id. The GC/MS method
is more accurate and expansive, thus providing a more reliable indicia of current impairment which
favors constitutionality. Id. at 389. Mr. Sultanik's second hypothetical is essentially the fact pattern
presented to the court in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
Although at the time the article was written only the Schaill court had upheld suspicionless drug
testing in public schools, Mr. Sultanik concluded that mandatory drug testing was an option school
administrators should consider when facing a drug problem. Sultanik, supra, at 394. See infra
notes 245-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School
Corp. case.
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vigorously debating the constitutional issues raised by mandatory drug testing. 9
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,2" the Supreme Court allowed a
school to require its student athletes to 'submit to mandatory, random,
suspicionless drug testing as a condition to be eligible to participate in an athletic
program.2  While drug testing student athletes \is now permitted, whether other
student groups, or the entire student body, may be tested is not settled.' The
problem no longer is whether drug testing stladenfts is allowed; rather, the
problem is determining which students may be te~ed. 23 Has the Supreme
19. In January 1997, eighteen-year-old high school student Hollister Gardner filed the most
recent publicized lawsuit challenging a student drug testing policy. Mark Babineck, Student
Challenges Drug Testing Policy, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 2, 1997, at 24A (reporting that the
lawsuit was filed in the federal district court located in Amarillo, Texas). The lawsuit names the
Tulia Independent School District board members, including Hollister's father, as defendants. Id.
Hollister, who is the president of the National Honor Society and a member of a number of
extracurricular groups, is representing himself. Id. He is arguing that the school district's blanket
application of drg testing all students involved in any extracurricular activities goes beyond the
scope of the Supreme Court's recent decision upholding a drug testing policy aimed at student
athletes. Id. See also Laurie Asseo, Teen Sues School Board, Including Dad, PATRIOT LEDGER,
Feb. 25, 1997, at 2; Allan Turner, Defending His Rights: Student Risking All to Oppose Drug
Testing, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 2, 1997, at 1.
Previous cases challenging drug testing in the public schools include the following: Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (upholding the constitutionality of mandatory,
random, suspicionless drug testing); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1988) (upholding drug testing student athletes); Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 69, 863 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1994) (striking down a drug testing policy as violating
students' privacy rights under the Arizona state constitution, and lack of consent); Brooks v. East
Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that no
extraordinary circumstances existed to justify suspicionless testing, also noting the absence of
evidence that students who participate in extracurricular activities are more likely to use drugs than
nonparticipants); Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (invalidating a drug testing
policy because of unreliable test results, and the procedure of visual monitoring of the act of
urination); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1985) (holding a drug testing policy unreasonably intrusive on privacy that could not be
justified by the numbers and percentages of students referred to drug counseling as compared to the
total student body).
20. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
21. For a discussion of the Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton case, see infra notes 294-361
and accompanying text.
22. See infra section IV.A (discussing the expansion of student drug testing outside the context
of athletics).
23. School boards across the country are currently debating whether they can constitutionally
expand drug testing policies to include students who participate in extracurricular activities other than
athletics. See, eg., Michael Ehret, New Reason for Students to Just Say No: Proposed Policy Would
Require Those in Activities to Agree to Random Sampling, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 22, 1997, at
C1 (Brownsburg school officials propose random drug testing for students grades seven through
twelve involved in any extracurricular activities, including athletics, jazz band, show choir, and
Spanish club); Jennifer Dziura, Pot-Testing Top Students Just Doesn 't Make Sense, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
& LEDGER STAR, Feb. 9, 1996, at El (Norfolk School Board considers extending drug testing to
include student "role models" such as class officers, band members, and participants in
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Court given school districts a green light to require students to consent to the
possibility of a random drug test as a condition to participating in extracurricular
activities such as band, drama club, dance team, or Spanish club, or is random
drug testing limited to student athletes? The Acton decision definitely does not
signal a red light to student drug testing, and probably not a green light either.
Rather, the Acton decision should be viewed as a yellow light that signals school
districts to proceed with caution in this area. Uncertainty plagues this area of
the law,24 the scope of permissible testing is unclear, and a manageable set of
guidelines needs to be established.'
This Note provides school districts that want to implement a drug testing
policy a manageable set of guidelines, enabling them to curb drug use to provide
a safe educational environment while simultaneously protecting the students'
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.'
Section II of this Note will provide an overview of the Fourth Amendment.37
This Section sets the constitutional context in which drug testing policies are
scrutinized by discussing the development of the administrative search and its
application to drug testing in the employment sector.28 This Section will also
.extracurricular groups that represent the school system in public"); Random Testing an
Overreaction, READING TIMES & EAGLE, Feb. 9, 1996, at B4 (Boyertown School District considers
drug testing students who participate in athletics, band, and clubs after student caught with heroin);
Richard Batzer, School Lawyer to Research Drug Testing, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 12, 1995, at B5
(North Tonawanda School Board debates whether testing should be limited to athletes or extended
to other students, such as band and drama club members).
Some school districts have even expanded their drug testing policies to include any student
who drives to school. Spencer F. Goodson, Refusing to Submit to Random Drug Tests,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 20, 1997, at A15 (editorial opinion objecting to the fact that a seventeen-
year-old honor student can no longer drive to school because he refused to submit to random,
suspicionless urine testing for drugs); Mary Wade Atteberry, Details of Drug Testing Explained,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 31, 1997, at B3 (explaining a new random drug testing policy for students
who drive to school).
24. The Acton case has generated a substantial amount of recent commentary attempting to
determine the limits of the Supreme Court's decision. See generally Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & G.
Michaele O'Brien, Drug Testing of Students in Public Schools: Implications of Vernonia School
District v. Acton for Other Types of School-Related Drug Searches, 113 EDUC. LAW REP. 521
(1996); Darrel Jackson, Note, The Constitution Expelled: What Remains of Student's Fourth
Amendment Rights?, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 673 (1996); Denise E. Joubert, Note, Message in a Bottle:
The United States Supreme Court Decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 56 LA. L.
REV. 959 (1996); Cornelius J. O'Brien, Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Fourth
Amendment-Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1167 (1996); Wayne
R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of a Patron Saint, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2570-89 (1996).
25. See infra section IV. for a discussion of expanding drug testing outside athletics and a set
of proposed guidelines for implementing such a policy.
26. See infra section IV.
27. See infra section U.
28. See infra section II.
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trace the evolution of the Fourth Amendment's special needs exception and its
application to public schools from the foundational case of New Jersey v.
T.L.O.29 to the present battle over mandatory drug testing.' Section III will
then describe a drug testing procedure implemented in public school athletic
programs, 3' followed by an analysis of the constitutional implications of
mandatory, suspicionless drug testing in public schools.32 Finally, Section IV
of this Note will propose a set of guidelines for school districts which determine
when a drug testing program is appropriate and what specific procedures must
be followed to ensure that the program is constitutional. 3
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
A. An Overview of the Fourth Amendment
The most prominent legal issue raised by random, suspicionless drug testing
of public school students is the legality of such a policy under the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The
Fourth Amendment is the framework from which courts will base their decisions
in cases that challenge student drug testing. It defines the parameters of
permissible testing. Thus, an understanding of the Fourth Amendment is an
essential requirement in the process of developing a set of guidelines to
determine whether a drug testing program is permissible.
29. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). For a discussion of the New Jersey v. T.L.O. case, see infra notes
174-94 and accompanying text.
30. See infra section II.
31. This note will not address the constitutional issues raised by drug testing athletes at the
collegiate, olympic, or professional level. For recent commentary addressing these issues, see
generally Eric N. Miller, Comment, Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School and College Athletes
After Acton: Similarities and Differences, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 301, 317-27 (1996) (analyzing drug
testing at the collegiate level); Steven 0. Ludd, Athletics, Drug Testing and the Right to Privacy:
A Question of Balance, 34 How. L.J. 599, 617-26 (1991) (discussing professional and collegiate
drug testing); Alan Fecteau, NCAA State Action: Not Present When Regulating Intercollegiate
Athletes-But Does That Include Drug Testing Student Athletes?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 291
(1995) (discussing NCAA drug testing).
32. See infra section III.
33. See infra section IV.
34. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to state and local governments
(which include public school boards) through the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).
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1. What Constitutes a Search and State Action
At the beginning of any Fourth Amendment analysis is the threshold
question whether a search protected by the Fourth Amendment has occurred.3'
Not every act of inspection or inquiry that may be considered a search in the
ordinary meaning' of the word rises to the level of a protected search within
the purview of the Fourth Amendment.3" For example, when a parent inspects
her child's bedroom to discover if the child is hiding something, a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has not occurred. However, in the
ordinary sense of the word, the parent searched her child's room.
To invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment the government or its
agent must have conducted the search.3" This is the constitutional requirement
of state action.39 Simply put, if the government or its agent did not conduct
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Professor Berner offers a "reach-grasp"
dichotomy to explain the structure of the Fourth Amendment. Bruce G. Bemer, The Supreme Court
and the Fall of the Fourth Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REv. 383, 383 (1991). This dichotomy
essentially reduces the framework of the Fourth Amendment to pose two questions. Id. The first
question asks how far the Fourth Amendment reaches. Id. The answer to this question defines the
areas in which the government may conduct searches, but does not specify exactly what may be
searched within those areas. Id. The second question explores what may be searched. Id. It asks
which searches are unreasonable. Id. In other words, within the realm of reachable searches which
ones can be grasped, which are permitted, and which are prohibited? Id. The Fourth Amendment
only prohibits unreasonable searches.
36. The everyday use of the word "search" commonly means "to look into or over carefully
or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover something ... " WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1034 (150th Anniversary ed. 1981).
37. The text of the Fourth Amendment explicitly mentions only four categories that are
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures: "persons, houses, papers, and effects ....
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. However, through judicial interpretation the protection of the Fourth
Amendment has been expanded to include items in which an individual exhibits a subjective
expectation of privacy that society accepts as reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
38. "mhe actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by
the Fourteenth Amendment. . ." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). In T.L.O.,
the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that the history of the Fourth Amendment suggested that
the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures only intended to regulate the conduct of law
enforcement officers. Id. at 335. The Supreme Court has held the Fourth Amendment applicable
to the conduct of civil authorities in addition to the conduct of law enforcement officers. Id. (listing
the following examples: building inspectors, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967);
Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13
(1978); and fire fighters entering privately owned property to extinguish a fire, Michigan v. Tyler,
436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978)).
39. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452-86
(4th ed. 1991) (discussing the concept of state action). "[T]he amendments to the Constitution which
protect individual liberties specifically address themselves to actions taken by the United States or
a state." Id. at 452. Thus, the Fourth Amendment provides protection only from searches
conducted by the government or its agent. Id. If the government is conducting a search through
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the search, then no search has occurred to implicate the Fourth Amendment
because the Fourth Amendment does not protect searches conducted by a private
party. 40
Recall the example of the parent searching her child's room. There, a
search has not taken place because a parent is not a state actor and is not acting
as the government's agent.4 Thus, the requirement of state action is not met
when a parent searches her child's bedroom, and the Fourth Amendment
accordingly is not implicated.
In contrast, the requirement of state action is met when public school
officials implement a drug testing policy.42 The Supreme Court has recognized
that public school officials are government agents.43 Thus, the requirement of
state action is met when schools drug test students because public school
officials, administrators, and teachers are all state actors."
Meeting the state action requirement is only the initial step in a Fourth
Amendment analysis. Not every act of inspection taken by the government or
its agent implicates the constitution. To determine what actions constitute a
search to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
developed a two pronged test. 5 In Katz v. United States,46 the Court stated
that to determine whether a search has occurred an individual must first have
a state actor, such as a police officer, or an individual acting as an agent for the government, the
requirement of state action is met. Id. However, a private individual, such as a parent in the above
example, is not a state actor or an individual acting as an agent for the government that must comply
with the requirements set out in the Fourth Amendment before conducting a search.
40. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to even an arbitrary search or seizure conducted by a private
party).
41. See supra note 38.
42. See infra note 178.
43. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. For a discussion of the T.L.O. case, see infra notes 174-94 and
accompanying text.
44. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school
officials).
45. See generally I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1 (2d ed. 1987) for a
discussion of the two pronged test which defines protected areas and interests. Professor LaFave
is "the nation's leading authority on the fourth amendment." Brian J. Serf, Great Expectations of
Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 594 (1989). One
court has even referred to Professor LaFave as the "patron saint of the search and seizure law."
Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
46. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [1997], Art. 25
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss2/25
1997] STUDENT DRUG TESTING GUIDELINES 731
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in an item.47  Second, that
expectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable.4" This test has become known as the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy test. 49
The previous example of a parent searching her child's room illustrates the
application of the Katz test.5 ° The first part of the test requires an individual
to have a subjective expectation of privacy.5 A minor child may very well
subjectively believe that he has an expectation of privacy in his room. Thus, the
child has met the first prong of the test. However, having a subjective
expectation of privacy only satisfies the first portion of the test. The second part
of the test requires the subjective expectation of privacy to be reasonable.52 A
general societal standard determines the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy. A minor child's expectation of privacy in his bedroom does not meet
this standard because it is not an expectation that society accepts as reasonable.
Thus, a parent's search of her child's bedroom is not a search as far as the
Fourth Amendment is concerned.
Returning to the specific issue addressed in this Note, drug testing through
urinalysis is a search which the Fourth Amendment protects.53 An individual
has a subjective expectation of privacy in the excretory function which society
has long recognized is reasonable.' Drug testing invades this privacy
47. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Commentators have disputed "whether such a
subjective expectation is or ought to be a prerequisite to a finding that a Fourth Amendment search
has occurred." 1 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 2. 1(b), at 308. Professor Amsterdam has even stated
that "[ain actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what
Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects." Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974). "Because 'the courts frequently do
not distinguish between the two parts of the Katz test,' little attention has been given to the
independent significance of the first factor or to precisely how it is to be interpreted." 1 LAFAvE,
supra note 45, § 2.1(c), at 309 (quoting Eric Dean Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age
of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725, 744-45 (1985)).
48. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. See, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
50. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 54-56, 77, 132-33, 152-55 and accompanying text for a further discussion
of the privacy interests implicated by the collection and testing of urine.
54. "Iln our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so
much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely distressing,
as detracting from one's dignity and self-esteem." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 646 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
487 (1968)).
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
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interest.55 Therefore, following the Katz expectation of privacy test, drug
testing is considered an intrusion that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 6
2. The Reasonableness, Warrant, and Probable Cause Requirements
A search that meets the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and is
conducted by the government or its agent may still not come within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.57 Even if a search has occurred, the
Fourth Amendment will only prohibit the search if it is unreasonable."
Prohibiting only unreasonable searches is a general requirement, applicable to
all searches, found expressly within the text of the Fourth Amendment. 9
Just as reasonableness in general is an amorphous concept, so also is the
definition, if one exists, of a reasonable search. In an attempt to define a
reasonable search, the Supreme Court has stated that reasonableness "depends
upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature
of the search or seizure itself." 6 This vague standard compelled the
development of a balancing test. 6 In considering all the circumstances, a court
will balance the intrusion of a search on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the promotion of the government's legitimate interests.' This
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in
public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Id. at 617 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)).
55. Id. See infra notes 128-63 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Skinner
case.
56. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. "[Tlhe collection and testing of urine is, of course, a search of
a person, one of only four categories of suspect searches the Constitution mentions by name."
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386,2400 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
the Fourth Amendment's specific textual reference to four categories of suspect searches: "persons,
houses, papers, and effects").
57. Returning to Professor Berner's "reach-grasp" dichotomy, this is the grasp analysis.
Berner, supra note 35, at 383. At this point in a Fourth Amendment analysis the Katz test has been
satisfied. The question now remains to be answered whether the search, as defined by Katz, is
reasonable.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. Note that the Fourth Amendment does
not require investigative practices to be reasonable unless a determination has first been made that
a search or seizure has occurred. Amsterdam, supra note 47, at 356 (noting that law enforcement
practices do not have to be reasonable unless they are either searches or seizures).
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The reasonableness clause in the Fourth
Amendment specifically includes "[tihe right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
60. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
61. See infra notes 85-117 and accompanying text (discussing the origin and application of the
balancing test).
62. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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balancing test provides the framework for courts to decide whether a particular
drug testing policy passes constitutional muster, or crosses the line and becomes
an unconstitutional search.63
Before a court will engage in such a balancing test, the reasonableness of
a search is usually defined by the warrant and probable cause requirements.'
These requirements mandate that a searching authority obtain a warrant based
upon probable cause prior to conducting a search. 6  The purpose of the
warrant requirement is to ensure that the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment
are not forgotten in a rush of "hurried actions" by anxious authorities.' This
purpose is accomplished by the warrant process which requires a "neutral and
detached magistrate"67 to decide whether sufficient probable cause s exists to
issue a warrant.' Interjecting a neutral magistrate into the warrant process
ideally serves as a check against the potential for officials to arbitrarily invade
63. See infra section III.
64. See supra note 34 (setting out the text of the Fourth Amendment).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (standing for
the proposition that the Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference for compliance with the
warrant requirement). Many commentators have also expressed a preference for strict adherence
to the warrant requirement. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 45, § 4.1, at 118; Phyllis T. Bookspan,
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473
(1991); Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1991); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MiCH. L. REv. 1468 (1985);
Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
603 (1982).
66. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
67. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
68. While the text of the Fourth Amendment specifically mentions that "no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause. . . ," a universally accepted definition or explanation of probable cause
does not exist. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (emphasis added). Probable cause is "an exceedingly
difficult concept to objectify" one commentator has stated. Joseph G. Cook, Probable Cause to
Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REV. 317, 317 (1971). The Supreme Court has made a similar assertion
stating that "probable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Despite its elusive meaning, the importance and
tradition of probable cause in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is reflected in the Supreme Court's
statement that "[tihe requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history." Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). One explanation of probable cause that may prove
helpful states that "[i]ts function is to guarantee a substantial probability that the invasions involved
in the search will be justified by discovery of offending items." Comment, Search and Seizure in
the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
69. Professor LaFave notes "that a significant part of the protection which flows from the
warrant process stems from the fact that the critical probable cause decision is being made by a
person possessing certain attributes and acting in a certain way." 2 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 4.2,
at 151. This protection is based on the assumption that a neutral and detached magistrate will not
be influenced by the competing goals of law enforcement. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
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an individual's security and privacy interests. In other words, the warrant
requirement limits the possibility of an official abusing his or her discretion.
In recent years the Supreme Court has carved out numerous exceptions to
the warrant and probable cause requirements.7' Warrantless searches have
been upheld when exigent circumstances require an immediate search to prevent
the destruction or loss of evidence7 and when law enforcement officers are in
hot pursuit of a suspect.' Further, neither stop and frisk searches' nor
searches at the border require a warrant.74 The rationale for these exceptions
is that adequate time to obtain a warrant is not available.
The Supreme Court has also recognized a plain view exception; 75 an auto-
mobile exception;76 an exception for items knowingly exposed to the public,77
70. See Myron Schreck, The Fourth Amendment in the Public Schools: Issues for the 1990s and
Beyond, 25 URB. LAW. 117, 118-19 (1993) (discussing various cases carving out exceptions to the
warrant and probable cause requirements).
71. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
72. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding evidence obtained by officers who
entered a house in pursuit of an armed robber admissible even though the search was warrantless).
But cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (holding invalid an officer's arrest of an
individual for driving while intoxicated pursuant to a warrantless entry into the suspect's home
despite the existence of the hot pursuit theory).
73. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
74. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
75. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971). Although the plain view doctrine is often characterized as an exception to the warrant
requirement, it is well settled that government observation of objects in plain view is not even a
search because there has been no invasion of privacy. Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch"
Corollary: A Natural and Foreseeable Consequence of the Plain View Doctrine, 95 DICK. L. REV.
521, 523-24 (1991).
76. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
77. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not subject to
the Fourth Amendment's protection. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The
application of this principle is illustrated by a Supreme Court case which dealt with aerial police
surveillance. In California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), through aerial surveillance the police
obtained evidence that the defendant was cultivating marijuana. The defendant argued that the aerial
surveillance of his yard was an unreasonable search because he had erected a fence around his yard
to provide privacy. However, the Court held that despite the measures the defendant took to restrict
some views of his activities, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial police
surveillance. Id. at 214. The Court reasoned that the search was not unreasonable because the
police had a right to observe anything any member of the public could have observed from a public
vantage point. Id. at 213-14. Thus, because any member of the public flying over the defendant's
yard could have seen exactly what the police saw, their observations were not unreasonable. Id.
The mere fact that the defendant had taken some measures to restrict some views of his activities
did not preclude the police from making observations from a vantage point where they had a right
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abandoned,7 or located in an open field;' and an exception for consensual
to be. Id. at 213. See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left on a public street
for collection because the garbage is knowingly exposed to the public).
If an individual sufficiently exposes an item in such a way that it is readily accessible to
animals, scavengers, or other members of the public, an expectation of privacy in that item is not
reasonable. Id. In Greenwood, the Court held that an individual did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in garbage bags that he left on the curb outside his house. d. The Court
reasoned that because it was common knowledge that the trash collector, other members of the
public, or even animals could rummage through the garbage, society was not prepared to accept that
an expectation of privacy in such garbage was reasonable. Id.
Although urine is discharged from the body and treated as a waste product, it is not knowingly
exposed to the public like the garbage in Greenwood. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp.,
864 F.2d 1309, 1312 (1988). "[Ihe highly private manner by which an individual disposes of his
or her urine demonstrates that it is not intended to be inspected or examined by anyone . . . ." Id.
Cf. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (holding that the compelled production of a
handwriting sample is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because a
handwriting sample is constantly exposed to the public); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14
(1973) (holding that the compelled production of a voice exemplar is not a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment because a voice exemplar is constantly exposed to the public). While the
compelled production of a voice or handwriting exemplar is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the courts have held that compelled production of other various body samples
are searches that infringe on an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy. Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (holding that the removal of scrapings from under an individual's
fingernails is a search); Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a breath analysis constitutes a search); State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 846-47 (R.I.
1980) (same); Thornburg v. Dora, 677 F. Supp. 581, 586-87 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (same); United States
v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341 (11 th Cir. 1984) (holding that an X-ray constitutes a search); United
States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548,
550 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that compelled production of a pubic hair sample is a search). In a
situation more on point to the compelled production and examination of urine, the Supreme Court
has held that the detention of an individual until he or she has a bowel movement that is subject to
inspection constitutes a search. United States v. Montoya de Henandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); see
also United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1984). "Certainly, the
compelled production and examination of an individual's urine cannot be considered less intrusive
than the searches involved in these cases." Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1312 n.1.
78. The warrantless search of an item that has been abandoned does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). An individual may retain a
property interest in an item while at the same time relinquish his or her reasonable expectation of
privacy in it. United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Thomas, upon
seeing the police, the defendant placed his gym bag in front of an apartment door and then left the
premises. The court held that the defendant had abandoned the gym bag. Id. at 846. The court
reasoned that because the test to determine intent to abandon is an objective one from which intent
can be inferred, the defendant's actions had objectively manifested an intent to abandon his gym bag.
Id. The possibility that the defendant intended to retrieve his bag did not alter the court's conclusion
that the defendant intended to abandon it. Id. at 846-47 n.5. The defendant's ability to retrieve the
bag depended on the fortuity that other persons with access to the public hallway would not disturb
it while it lay there unattended. Id.
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searches' to allow the searching party to bypass the warrant requirement.
Neither a warrant nor probable cause is needed for a search incident to a lawful
arrest,81 for an inventory search of property impounded by law enforcement
officials,' or for administrative noncriminal searches such as the inspection of
closely regulated businesses,83 and drug testing of certain employees."
The development of judicially crafted exceptions to the warrant and
probable clause requirements has increased the need for courts to use a
balancing test to determine whether a search is reasonable. Without strict
adherence to the warrant and probable clause requirements, a court must look
to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment for guidance. The
development of the reasonableness balancing test, which courts will use to
scrutinize student drug testing policies, can be traced to the administrative search
cases.
B. The Administrative Search8
The balancing test that emerged from the administrative search cases
developed into a constitutional standard to determine the reasonableness of a
search under the Fourth Amendment. The government's need to enforce
residential and commercial building codes provided the impetus for the
development of the administrative search exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirements. The administrative search became the means to enable
79. An expectation of privacy in an open field is generally considered unreasonable because
open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Fourth Amendment is
intended to shield from government interference or surveillance. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 179 (1984). In Oliver, after disregarding a no trespassing sign and entering the defendant's
fenced-in field, the police discovered a marijuana crop. The Court held that despite the fence and
the no trespassing sign, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his field
because it was still generally accessible to the public. Id.
80. United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1980); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
81. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
82. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976).
83. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (permitting warrantless inspections of
automobile junkyards); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (inspecting mines for compliance
with safety requirements); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (inspecting gun dealers).
84. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). For a discussion of the Skinner and Von
Raab cases, see infra notes 125-73 and accompanying text.
85. The following cases illustrate typical administrative searches: Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (building inspection for housing code violations); O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987) (government employer's search of employee's desk); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of public school students and their belongings); Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints).
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municipalities to inspect an ever increasing number of residential and
commercial buildings. To facilitate this enormous task, local ordinances
typically permitted municipal employees to enter private premises to perform
their inspection duties.'s These ordinances also made refusal to admit an
authorized inspector a violation punishable by fine or imprisonment.
s7
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of administrative
searches in Frank v. Maryland." There, the Court held that warrantless
86. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 10.1, at 597-98.
87. Id. § 10.1, at 598.
88. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In
Frank, acting on a complaint from a resident that rats were in her basement, a health inspector began
an inspection of the houses in the vicinity looking for the source of the rats. Id. at 361. The
inspector knocked on the door of Frank's home, and after receiving no response, examined the
outside of the house. Id. This inspection revealed that the house was in an extreme state of decay,
and that in the rear of the house there was a pile of rodent feces mixed with straw, trash, and debris
weighing approximately half a ton. Id. Frank arrived during the inspection. Id. The inspector
asked Frank for permission to inspect the interior of his home. Id. Frank refused and was
subsequently arrested and found guilty of violating the Baltimore City Code even though the
inspector never had a warrant authorizing him to enter Frank's home. Id. at 361-62.
The Fourth Amendment was previously found to be applicable to administrative searches in
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd 339 U.S. 1 (1950). In Little,
the court reversed a homeowner's conviction for refusing to allow a health inspector entry into her
home without a search warrant. Id. The government argued that the Fourth Amendment should not
apply to administrative searches because the purpose of the search was the protection of public
health, not the investigation of a crime. Id. at 16-17. The court did not agree with the
government's distinction. The court reasoned that because the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures was based on the "common law right to privacy," no distinction could be
made to separate the freedoms from search and seizure between searches for criminal and non-
criminal purposes. Id. As Judge Prettyman poignantly stated:
[The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures] was firmly established in
the common law as one of the bright features of the Anglo-Saxon contributions to
human progress. It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. It belonged to
all men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected. So much is clear from any
examination of history, whether slight or exhaustive .... To say that a man suspected
of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but that
a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity ....
Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The decision and reasoning in Little would prove to be prophetic; the
Supreme Court would first reject it in Frank, only to return to it in Camara v. Municipal Court, See
v. City of Seattle, and the current administrative search cases. 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 34:2, at 377-80 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the history of the administrative search
in the Supreme Court). See infra notes 95-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of Camara
v. Municipal Court and See v. City of Seattle. See also JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 246-48 (1966) (discussing the District of Columbia v. Little
case).
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administrative searches were constitutional.89 Of more importance than the
decision itself, which would enjoy a short life as valid precedent, are the factors
the Court addressed in deciding the case. First, the Court took into account the
remedy the government sought. 90 Because the government was not seeking
evidence for criminal prosecution, the Court found the inspection to "touch at
most upon the periphery of the important interests" which the constitution
protects. 9' Next, the Court noted that the government's limited power of
inspection adequately protected an individual's private property from arbitrary
searches.' Finally, the Court emphasized that the general welfare of the
community made these searches of indispensable importance, the effectiveness
of which would be greatly hindered by the requirements necessary for a search
for evidence of criminal acts.' In light of these factors the Court concluded
that warrantless administrative searches were constitutional.'
Only eight years later, the Supreme Court overruled Frank in two
administrative search cases heard and decided together: Camara v. Municipal
Court of San Francisco" and See v. City of Seattle.' These cases had a
89. Frank, 359 U.S. at 365-67. See Loree L. French, Note, Skinner v. Railway Executives'
Association and the Fourth Amendment Warrant-Probable Cause Requirement: Special Needs
Exception Creating a Shakedown Inspection?, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 129-30 (1990) (discussing
the Frank case and the historical development of the administrative search exception).
90. Frank, 359 U.S. at 366.
91. Id. at 367. But cf. Little, 178 F.2d at 16-17 (criticizing the argument that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply in cases where the purpose of the search is protection of public health,
not investigation of crime, as "preposterous in fact" and without basis). In Frank, the Court also
stated that the inspection caused "only the slightest" infringement on individual privacy rights.
Frank, 359 U.S. at 367. The Court reasoned that such an infringement "must be assessed in the
light of the needs which have produced it" to decide that the search was constitutional. Id. This
language suggests that the Court applied a balancing test in this case without formally acknowledging
to have done so.
92. Frank, 359 U.S. at 366. Valid grounds for suspicion were required, and the inspection was
to take place at a reasonable time during the day. Id. In this case, the pile of rodent feces combined
with the run down condition of the house provided adequate suspicion that a nuisance existed. Id.
93. Id. at 372. The Court bolstered this point stating "[t l he need for preventive action is great,
and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and
these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few." Id. John Wesley Hall
made this interesting comment in response to the Court's assertion:
This is one of those paternalistic arguments like "We're from the Government, and we're here
to help you." Or, as long as the Government's purpose is paternalistic and not investigatory,
the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Thus, because most people are willing to sacrifice or
not assert their rights, the Fourth Amendment rights of all may be devalued?
2 HALL, supra note 88, § 34:2, at 379 n.28.
94. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-67 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
95. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
96. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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profound impact on the law of search and seizure.' In Camara, the tenant of
an apartment building refused to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence
by a city health inspector.9" After refusing three times to allow an inspection
the police arrested and charged the tenant with a misdemeanor." The Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction of the case in view of the "growing nationwide
importance" of the administrative search problem. t o
The Court overruled Frank to the extent that the decision permitted
warrantless administrative searches.1 'O In reaching this decision, the Court
first noted that the practice of permitting warrantless administrative searches did
not adequately ensure the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment "to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials.""°2 The Court then proceeded to reject the Frank Court's premise
that administrative searches "touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the
important interests safeguarded by the [constitution] . . . . " Having
concluded that administrative searches are significant intrusions upon the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court then discredited the
assertion that the warrant process could not function effectively in this field. "0l
In sum, the Court concluded that except in emergency situations, the searching
authority must obtain a search warrant prior to conducting an administrative
search. 105
97. 2 HALL, supra note 88, § 34:3, at 380 (noting the profound effect Camara and See would
have on the law of search and seizure in general). See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 1. See also
1 KENNErH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4:8 (2d ed. 1978).
98. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967). The inspection was conducted
pursuant to the San Francisco Municipal Code which allowed for a routine annual inspection for
possible violations of the city's Housing Code. Id. at 526.
99. Id. at 526-27. Charges were brought against the tenant pursuant to § 507 of the Housing
Code for refusing to permit a lawful inspection. Id. at 527.
100. Id. at 525.
101. Id. at 528. Although Frank could arguably be distinguished on its facts from Camara, the
Court nevertheless felt compelled to overrule it because the opinion had "generally been interpreted
as carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 529.
102. Id. at 528.
103. Id. at 530 (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959)). The Court opined that
"[it is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by
the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Id.
104. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-34 (1967).
105. Id. The Court was concerned that the practical effect of allowing a warrantless
administrative search would give an inspector too much discretion in the field. Id. at 532. "This
is precisely the discretion to invade private property which [the Court] hals] consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search." Id. at 532-33.
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Camara marked the first time the Supreme Court balanced the
government's interests in effective regulatory enforcement against an individual's
privacy interests. After balancing these interests, the Court determined that the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement would permit a lesser standard
of probable cause to justify an administrative search than that required in
searches for evidence of criminal violation.'1 The Court explained that the
unique character of administrative searches required evaluating whether some
accommodation short of probable cause could adequately balance public need
and individual rights."°7  The Court ultimately set out a reasonableness
standard for administrative searches that balances valid public interests against
private invasions produced by the search."ta
The balancing test the Court set out in Camara would be readily
followed."°9 In See v. City of Seattle,"" the Supreme Court applied the
principles established in Camara to the inspection of commercial structures not
used as private residences."' In addition to building inspections, courts have
extended these principles to permit the inspection of closely regulated businesses
such as the pharmaceutical," 2  firearm," 3  gaming," 4  nuclear,"15  and
106. 2 HALL, supra note 88, § 34:3, at 382; see generally 3 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 10.1 (b),
at 184-91 (discussing the Cainara Court's analysis balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails).
107. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. The unique situation the administrative search poses, as
compared to a search pursuant to a criminal investigation, is the goal of widespread compliance with
a particular standard. Id. at 535. In Camara, the goal of the inspections was securing city-wide
compliance with minimum safety standards for private property, whether the deviations were
intentional or unintentional. Id. Thus, in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a
warrant, the Court concluded that the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of the
reasonable goals of code enforcement. Id.
108. Id. at 539. In particular, the Court asserted that three factors combined to support the
reasonableness of administrative searches: (1) the long history of judicial and public acceptance; (2)
the public interest demanding that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated; and (3) the fact
that the invasions only involved a limited invasion of privacy. Id. at 537. See also 3 LAFAVE,
supra note 45, § 10.1(b), at 184-91 (discussing the three factors the Court balanced in Camara).
109. In fact, the Court acknowledged that "no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails" could adequately
resolve the administrative search dilemma. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
110. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
111. Id. at 542. Again, the Court established a reasonableness scheme for the inspection of
commercial premises. Id. at 542-43.
112. United States v. Prendergast, 436 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
113. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding the inspection of a licensed gun
dealer's storeroom).
114. Lanchester v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 325 A.2d 648 (Pa. Conmw. Ct.
1974) (upholding the warrantless search of a horse trainer's truck located on a state licensed horse
racing facility). See also Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding the
random drug testing of jockeys, trainers, grooms and track officials).
740
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mining"6 industries. The reasonableness balancing test for administrative
searches is now firmly established in the Fourth Amendment's search and
seizure jurisprudence." 7
C. The Special Needs Exception
Yet another exception permits a court to engage in a balancing test rather
than adhere to the Fourth Amendment's textual requirements where the
government can articulate a special need."' The special needs doctrine
recognizes that exceptional circumstances, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable.
The Supreme Court created this exception in New Jersey v. T.L.O., " 9 where
the Court addressed the scope of protection public school children receive under
the Fourth Amendment. 20 The Court ultimately held that public school
officials do not need to obtain a warrant in order to search students.12' The
Court justified this position by stating that a warrant requirement would frustrate
"the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools." 2
Thus, the special needs exception was created to allow even more searches to
be conducted without first obtaining a warrant.
After its introduction into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the special
needs exception expanded. Examples of special needs searches today are
numerous. They include searches of prisoners, parolees, and probationers, as
115. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
drug testing of employees at a nuclear power plant).
116. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (upholding the warrantless administrative
search of a mine).
117. Variations of a four pronged balancing test have since emerged to determine the
reasonableness of an administrative search. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). These tests
seek to balance (1) the importance of the governmental interest; (2) the physical or psychological
intrusion upon the individual's privacy interests; (3) the amount of discretion an official has in
conducting the search; and (4) the effectiveness and necessity of the intrusion in reaching its goals.
Id. at 654-61.
118. The special needs exception originated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
In order to clarify when a warrant based upon probable cause did not need to be obtained prior to
conducting a search, Justice Blackmun stated that "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of
the Framers." Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun's concerns have become
known as the special, or compelling, needs doctrine which dictates when the warrant and probable
cause requirements may be bypassed.
119. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
120. See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the New Jersey
v. T.L.O. case.
121. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
122. Id.
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well as border searches, immigration stops and searches, airport security checks,
administrative and regulatory searches, and military searches.' A recent
example of the growing prevalence of the administrative search balancing test
and the special needs exception is the Supreme Court's analysis of drug testing
certain employees.
24
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,Ia and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab," the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of random, suspicionless drug testing of certain employees. The
Court relied on the special needs exception to allow such testing without a
warrant or probable cause. 27 The special needs addressed in each of these
cases were extraordinary safety concerns and national security hazards.
Skinner addressed whether regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) requiring that employees involved in train accidents
submit blood and urine samples for testing violated the Fourth Amendment.'I
The FRA promulgated these regulations based on findings that railroad employee
alcohol and drug use posed a serious threat to public safety.' 2 9 Previous
efforts to curb substance abuse based on observation of impaired railroad
employees had proven ineffective."' ° Thus, to more effectively detect and
deter substance abuse, the new regulations imposed a mandatory duty to test
123. HALL, supra note 88, § 38:1, at 494.
124. See infra notes 125-73 and accompanying text.
125. 489 U.S. 602 (1989), For an additional discussion and analysis of the Skinner case, see
generally French, supra note 89, at 117; Heidi P. Mallory, Note, Fourth Amendment-The
"Reasonableness" of Suspicionless Drug Testing of Railroad Employees, 80 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1052 (1990).
126. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). For an additional discussion and analysis of the Von Raab case, see
generally Kenneth C. Betts, Fourth Amendment-Suspicionless Urinalysis Testing: A Constitutionally
'Reasonable' Weapon in the Nation's War on Drugs?, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1018
(1990).
127. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
128. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
129. Id. The Court first noted that "[tihe problem of alcohol use on American railroads [was]
as old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it by carrier rules began at least a century ago."
Id. A review of accident investigation reports revealed concrete statistical evidence of this safety
problem. Id. at 607. Between 1972 to 1983 at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol
or drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor occurred on the nation's railroads. Id. These
accidents caused 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and an estimated $19 million in property
damage. Id. The accident investigation reports also identified "an additional 17 fatalities to
operating employees working on or around rail rolling stock that involved alcohol or drugs as a
contributing factor." Id. (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 30,726 (1983)).
130. Id. at 607-08. Comments to the proposed regulations from interested parties indicated that
railroads were only able to detect a small number of alcohol and drug violations relying on the
practice of observation by supervisors and co-workers. Id.
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employees involved in a train accident. '31
Skinner presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to address
the collection and testing of urine samples. 32 At the outset, the Court
concluded that the collection and testing of urine is a search which the Fourth
Amendment protects. 33 Next, the Court summarized the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement."'4 However, because the drug testing at issue did
not require either a warrant or probable cause, the Court was forced to turn its
discussion to the newly created special needs exception to justify the
searches. 
35
The Court began its analysis noting that "when faced with such special
needs, [it] [had] not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in [a]
131. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989). The specific
events triggering a mandatory duty to collect blood and urine samples were the following: a major
train accident, impact accident, and any train accident that involved a fatality. Id. at 609. An
additional regulation permitted permissive testing based on a supervisor's reasonable suspicion that
an employee was impaired. Id. at 611.
132. The Court first addressed whether the regulations satisfied the state action requirement to
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 614. The determination of "[wlhether a private party
should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Government for Fourth Amendment purposes turns
on the degree of the Government's participation in the private party's activities.... " Id. Although
the railroads were privately owned, the government exercised significant control and participation
in regulating the railroad industry. Id. at 615. Thus, the Court held that the government's
encouragement, endorsement, and participation in the implementation of the drug testing regulations
was sufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 615-16.
133. Id. at 617. Although the Court had long recognized that blood testing was an intrusion
that must be deemed a search, it faced a unique situation with the collection and testing of urine.
Id. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court set the precedent that compelled
physical intrusion infringed an expectation of privacy that society accepted as reasonable. Id. at 767-
68. Thus, the Skinner Court responded that:
Unlike the blood-testing procedure at issue in Schmerber, the procedures prescribed by
the FRA regulations for collecting and testing urine samples do not entail a surgical
intrusion into the body. It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of urine, like
that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including
whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the
process of collecting the sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual
or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests.
Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals
have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed
searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
134. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (stating that the reasonableness of a search is generally balanced
in favor of the warrant and probable cause requirements).
135. Id.
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particular context. " 136 The government's interest in ensuring the safety of the
travelling public and the railroad employees was the type of situation the special
needs exception was designed to effectuate. 37 Having concluded that a special
need existed, the Court then proceeded to determine whether the need was
sufficient enough to dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements.
The Court held that a warrant was not essential to the reasonableness
determination. 3 s  The Court reasoned that because the FRA regulations
narrowly defined the permissible testing limits to prevent arbitrary testing a
warrant would only frustrate the purpose of the search.139  Next, the Court
addressed the probable cause requirement.'"4 Generally, when the government
performs a search without a warrant the search must be based on probable cause
that a person has violated the law. 4 ' However, the searches in this case were
not based on a showing of probable cause. The FRA automatically tested the
employees after an accident whether they manifested any sign of impairment or
not. Therefore, this unique situation required the Court to address the concept
of individualized suspicion. 42
The Court began its discussion of the individualized suspicion requirement
noting that when circumstances exist to permit a search without probable cause,
"some quantum of individualized suspicion" is generally required.'43
However, the Court also made it clear that individualized suspicion is not an
absolute requirement.'" After noting the general adherence to the individual-
ized suspicion requirement, the Court recognized that in certain circumstances
136. Id. at 620-21.
137. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989).
138. Id. at 624.
139. Id. at 622-24. The drug testing would not be effective if it was not conducted as soon as
possible after an accident because the rate that alcohol and drugs leave the bloodstream may result
in the loss of valuable evidence. Id. at 623.
140. Id. at 624.
141. Id.
142. Id. An individualized suspicion requirement imposes a burden on the searching authority
to articulate a reason for searching a particular individual. Whether the Fourth Amendment contains
such a requirement is an issue that the Supreme Court has not settled. The Court would address this
issue in Skinner.
143. Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (quoting United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)). "When the balance of interests precludes insistence
on a showing of probable cause, [the Court] [has] usually required 'some quantum of individualized
suspicion' before concluding that a search is reasonable." Id.
144. Id. "A showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a
search must be presumed unreasonable." Id.
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a search may be reasonable absent individual suspicion.145  The Court had just
created yet another balancing test for administrative searches which enabled not
only the warrant requirement to be bypassed, but also the probable cause
requirement. 146
The application of this balancing test to the facts in Skinner ultimately
resulted in the Court deciding that the government's interest in safety
outweighed the railroad employees' privacy concerns. 147 On the government's
side of the balancing equation, the Court characterized the interest in testing
without a showing of individualized suspicion as compelling.' 48 However, on
the railroad employees' side of the equation, the Court characterized their
privacy interests as not unduly infringed. 14
9
The Court articulated a number of reasons why it concluded that the drug
testing program did not impose an undue infringement on the employees
justifiable expectations of privacy. First, the Court noted the context in which
the privacy intrusions took place. 1' Because the testing took place in the
employment context, any restrictions on the freedom of movement necessary to
obtain the urine samples were no greater than the restrictions the employees
impliedly consented to by accepting employment." '
Next, the Court addressed the unique privacy interests implicated by the
collection and testing of urine.'52 Unlike blood and breath tests, urinalysis
requires the performance of an excretory function traditionally shielded by great
145. Id. "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed
in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of such suspicion." Id.
146. Id. at 620-21 (noting the safety sensitive tasks the employees subject to drug testing
performed). In striking the balance between these competing interests, the Court noted the
government's compelling interest in protecting the safety of the traveling public. Id.
147. id. at 633.
148. Id. at 628 (noting the possibility that the employees subject to testing could cause great
human loss before any signs of impairment became noticeable).
149. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
150. Id. at 624.
151. Id. at 624-25 (noting that "an employee consents to significant restrictions on his freedom
of movement where necessary for his employment, and few are free to come and go as they please
during working hours"). The Court reasoned that any additional interference with an employee's
freedom of movement caused by the additional time it takes to obtain a urine sample could not be
characterized as a significant privacy interest. Id. at 625.
152. Id. at 626.
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privacy.153 While the Court did not characterize the additional privacy interest
in the excretory function as minimal, it noted the efforts taken to reduce the
intrusiveness of the collection process." Because the samples were collected
in a medical environment, and not under direct observation, the Court believed
that the employees' privacy interests were adequately safeguarded.'
Finally, and most importantly, the Court noted that the employees'
expectations of privacy were diminished by their participation in a heavily
regulated industry."s6 The Court reasoned that because many of the incidents
of railroad employment already intruded upon an employee's privacy the drug
testing was only minimally intrusive.' Therefore, after balancing the
employees' privacy interests against the government's compelling interest in
protecting the public from the potential for great human loss caused by railroad
accidents, the Court ultimately found the balance to weigh in favor of the
government. '
In his dissent, Justice Marshall vigorously criticized the special needs
exception.' 5 9 He argued that the Court should evaluate the FRA's drug testing
policy using traditional Fourth Amendment analysis."W This analysis would
153. Id. Previous Supreme Court decisions had concluded that blood tests were not significant
intrusions on an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762
(1985) (stating that "blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's
privacy and bodily integrity"). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (stating
"[tihe simple blood-alcohol test... is safe, painless, and commonplace"); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (noting that such tests are commonplace, and that for most people the
procedure involves virtually no risk, pain, or trauma); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436
(1957) (recognizing that "[tihe blood test procedure [had] become routine in our everyday life").
154. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.
155. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1989). The Court
also addressed the problem that certain private medical facts an employee might prefer not to
disclose would be discovered through the drug testing process. Id. at 627 n.7. The Court did not
view this as a significant invasion of privacy because there was no indication that the government
did not treat this information as confidential, or use it for any other purpose. Id.
156. Id. at 627.
157. Id. at628.
158. Id. at 627. The pervasive goal of regulating the railroad industry is to ensure safety.
Dependent upon this goal is the health and fimess of the railroad employees. Id. Thus, numerous
precautions are taken to ensure the safety of railroad employees. Id. Congress recognized the
relation between safety and fitness by enacting the Hours of Service Act in 1907. Id. Through the
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Congress also permitted government testing of all railroad
facilities, equipment or persons. Id. Even before the implementation of the drug testing policy at
issue, the FRA required that railroad employees undergo periodic physical examinations. Id. See
also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 833 F.2d 700, 705-06 (7th Cir.
1987); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N. R.R., 802 F.2d
1016, 1024 (8th Cir. 1986).
159. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 636-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 641-42.
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require a warrant based upon probable cause.' 6' In his view, the majority had
taken " its longest step yet toward reading the probable cause requirement out of
the Fourth Amendment." 62 However, the special needs exception appeared
to be firmly rooted as an exception to the traditional warrant and probable clause
requirements. 63
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,6' the Supreme
Court applied the special needs exception to hold that United States Customs
Service employees who carry firearms could constitutionally be required to
submit to suspicionless drug testing."a Just as in Skinner, the Court found a
special need that justified the departure from the traditional warrant and probable
cause requirements. "c The government and the public have a common
concern that employees charged with preventing controlled substances from
entering the country are themselves free from the effects of these
substances. 67 The Court also found that these employees had diminished
expectations of privacy due to the nature of their work."6  Thus, when the
Court applied the balancing test to this situation, the government's compelling
need to test outweighed the employees' privacy interests. 169
161. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641-42 (1989).
162. Id. at 636. Justice Marshall poignantly stated that "[c]onstitutional requirements like
probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present when advantageous, conveniently absent when
'special needs' make them seem not." Id. at 637. In his view, the "patchwork quilt of settings"
in which the special needs exception had been applied, resulted in the formation of an unguided
balancing test. Id. at 639. Invoking Justice Holmes' oft-quoted phrase that "principles of law, once
bent, do not snap back easily," Justice Marshall predicted that this unguided balancing test would
ultimately reduce the privacy all citizens enjoy. Id. at 655 (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
163. Id. at 636. Justice Marshall noted that the Court had allowed the special needs exception
to displace the textual requirements in each of the four categories of searches named in the Fourth
Amendment: searches of persons, houses, papers, and effects. Id. at 636-37.
164. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 666.
167. Id. at 668-71. These employees are the first line of defense against the national law
enforcement crisis caused by the smuggling of controlled substances. Id. at 668, This national
interest could be irreparably damaged if those charged with implementing it, because of their own
drug use, did not vigorously carry out their duty to prevent the flow of controlled substances into
the country. Id. at 670. These employees are required to carry firearms to protect their physical
safety. Id. at 669-70. The public and the government have a strong interest in ensuring that these
employees do not suffer from an impaired perception if a situation arises in which they are required
to employ deadly force. Id. at 670-71.
168. Id. at 672.
169. Id.
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These employment cases expanded the special needs exception created in
New Jersey v. T.L.O.1*° which balances the government's need to conduct a
particular search against an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 17" '
After the employment cases, the only compelling needs that would warrant the
implementation of a suspicionless drug test were those articulated in Skinner and
Von Raab: extraordinary safety concerns and national security hazards."
However, the Supreme Court's treatment of suspicionless drug testing in public
schools would expand the special needs exception even further."7
D. The Fourth Amendment in Public Schools
While the Supreme Court has stated that students do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, 74 the Court has never granted the
full protection of the Bill of Rights to schoolchildren. In particular, the Fourth
Amendment has never been given full force in the public school
environment. 75 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,76 the Court found the Fourth
170. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the T.L.O. case.
171. The scope of employees which courts have permitted to be tested for drugs has expanded
since Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), were decided. See, eg., IBEW Local 1245
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding drug testing
of employees at a nuclear power plant because the employees have a diminished expectation of
privacy, and the danger of catastrophic harm caused by a nuclear accident is great); AFGE Local
1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing of employees who hold top
security clearances); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th
Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing of truck drivers because the governmenthas a compelling interest
in ensuring that commercial trucks carrying large loads are operated in a safe manner); IBEW Local
1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the constitutionality of testing employees
who work on natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th
Cir. 1990) (upholding random urinalysis testing of airline personnel with safety responsibilities).
172. Numerous cases have expanded the scope of employees who must submit to drug testing.
See supra note 171. However, the compelling need justifying these searches has always been truly
serious concerns of a safety nature. See supra note 171.
173. See infra notes 195-372 and accompanying text for a discussion of suspicionless drug
testing in public schools.
174. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
175. The unique setting of the public school requires the student's Fourth Amendment interest
in privacy to be considered in light of the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in
maintaining discipline and order. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). The Supreme
Court has recognized that in the public school setting "lelvents calling for discipline are frequent
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action." Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 580 (1975)). Given these concerns, the Supreme Court has recognized that in order to
maintain discipline and security in the public school environment, disciplinary procedures must be
given a certain degree of flexibility. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-83. This flexibility can also be seen
as the result of the Supreme Court's willingness to recognize the importance of preserving the
informality of the student-teacher relationship to foster a positive educational environment. Ingraham
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Amendment to be applicable to searches conducted by school officials at public
schools. Before T.L. 0., it was not settled whether the Fourth Amendment even
applied in public schools. 77
Although the Fourth Amendment applies in public schools, the Court held
that public school officials 7 do not need to obtain a warrant in order to
search students. 179 The Court justified abandoning the warrant requirement
by stating that it would frustrate "the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools." 180 The Court stated that a search may be conducted
under "ordinary circumstances" without a warrant if the school based the search
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977).
176. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
177. Early theories found that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable in public schools.
RICHARD D. STRAHAN & L. CHARLES TURNER, THE COURTS AND THE SCHOOLS: THE SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATOR AND LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT TODAY 134 (1987). One theory simply asserted
that because school officials are not agents of the state that the requirement of state action is not met.
Id. Thus, under this theory the Fourth Amendment did not apply to searches of public school
students. Id. Another theory invoked the doct-ine of in loco parentis. Id. Under this old doctrine
the school stands in place of the parents. Id. The school is given authority over the student equal
to the authority of the parent. Id. at 129. Thus, just as a parent may search the person or property
of his or her child, the school also enjoys the same authority. Id. at 134. Finally, some courts were
willing to allow school searches that only imposed administrative, not criminal, penalties. Id. These
theories are no longer relevant after T.L.O.
178. The Court first noted that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. See
supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state action requirement.
179. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. T.L.O. was a 14 year-old high school freshman who was caught
smoking in the bathroom. Id. at 328. Upon being questioned by the assistant vice-principal in his
private office, she denied she had been smoking. Id. The vice-principal then demanded to see her
purse which he opened to discover a pack of cigarettes. Id. Further examination of the purse
revealed rolling papers known to be associated with the use of marijuana, a pipe, several empty
plastic bags, a small amount of marijuana, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who
owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implied she was dealing marijuana. Id. T.L.O. later
confessed to the police that she had been selling marijuana at school. Id. at 329. Based upon the
evidence seized by the assistant vice-principal and T.L.O.'s confession, the state successfully brought
delinquency charges against T.L.O. Id. at 329-30.
180. Id. at 340. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that the balancing test
was becoming the rule rather than the exception to the Framers' explicit requirement in the text of
the Fourth Amendment that a warrant be based upon probable cause. Id. He believed that the Court
had used the balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's warrant and
probable cause provisions, only when it had been confronted with "a special law enforcement need
for greater flexibility." Id. at 351 (citations omitted). In order to clarify when a warrant based upon
probable cause did not need to be obtained prior to conducting a search, Justice Blackmun stated that
"[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." Id. Justice Blackmun's concerns have
become known as the special, or compelling, needs doctrine which dictates when the warrant and
probable cause requirements can be bypassed.
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upon a reasonable suspicion'' that the individual student was violating school
policy or the law."S Thus, the Court essentially extended the administrative
search balancing test into the classroom and set the requisite suspicion
requirement at the lower reasonable suspicion level.'
The T.L.O. Court explained that reasonable suspicion depends on all the
circumstances'84 and the dictates of reason and common sense."u While this
standard should not impose a narrow notion of reasonableness,se at the same
181. The Court modified the level of suspicion required to justify a search from the traditional
probable cause test to a reasonable suspicion standard in the school setting. Id. at 341. See infra
notes 184-89 and accompanying text (describing what constitutes reasonable suspicion). But see 4
LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 10.1 l(b), at 807-32 (expressing a basis for concern about the Court's
analysis justifying a watered-down probable cause test). Professor LaFave points out that the
reasonable suspicion rule is not necessarily either consistent or inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment administrative search standard. Id. at 812. Rather, he expresses concern that the "rule
has been accepted without a sufficient showing that the traditional probable cause requirement is too
demanding in a [public] school setting." Id. The facts of the T.L.O. case itself illustrate Professor
LaFave's concern: only after the teacher reported she personally observed T.L.O. smoking in the
bathroom did the vice-principal search her purse. Id. at 814. Professor LaFave argues that these
facts provided the vice-principal sufficient evidence to conduct the search under the traditional
probable cause test. Id. Thus, Professor LaFave states that the T.L.O. case is just one more
example of a factual situation that does not establisl the need for a watered-down version of the
probable cause test. Id. In fact, after reviewing a number of school search cases, Professor LaFave
suggests "that in most instances the evidence of wrongdoing prompting teachers or principals to
conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable cause test."
Id. at 812.
182. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985).
183. To justify the departure from the "probable cause" requirement the Court noted that the
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches be reasonable. Id. at 340. The
Court stated that although "both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear
on the reasonableness of a search. .. in certain limited circumstances neither is required." Id. at
340-41 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). The Court recognized that in a number of situations the reasonableness of a search
does not require the level of suspicion to be set at probable cause. Id. at 341. See also Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-62
(1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967). Finally, the Court reasoned
that "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public
interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
184. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
185. Id. at 343. The Court stated that this standard would spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of learning the niceties of probable cause. Id. At the same time this
standard would ensure that the privacy interests of the students would not be invaded more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order and discipline in the school environment.
Id.
186. Id.
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time school officials are not allowed unfettered discretion to conduct
searches." s In addition to the reasonable suspicion requirement, a search of
school students or their possessions must also be reasonable in its scope.'u
For example, the existence of reasonable suspicion to search one location for a
particular object might not support a search of other locations. 8 9
The Supreme Court did not decide a pivotal issue which the random drug
testing of students raises. In T.L.O., the Court explicitly refused to decide
whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness
standard it adopted for school searches."9 Although the Fourth Amendment
generally requires some quantum of individualized suspicion, the Fourth
Amendment does not impose an irreducible requirement of such suspicion. 9'
Whether individualized suspicion is a necessary requirement for searches in
public schools is a question that is not settled."9
187. See Schreck, supra note 70, at 121-29 for a thorough discussion of recent court decisions
defining the nature of reasonable suspicion and reasonable scope. It is interesting to note that of 23
cases after the 1985 T.L.O. decision, only 3 cases have held that school officials lacked reasonable
suspicion to conduct a search. Id. at 122.
188. Id. at 127-29 (discussing recent cases defining the reasonable scope of school searches).
See also Stuart C. Berman, Note, Student Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the
T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1077 (1991) (offering four different school
search scenarios to delineate the proper scope of T.L.O. and proposing that courts analyze more
closely the circumstances surrounding particular school searches).
189. See, e.g., Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding
that the search of a student for drugs was not reasonable when she had merely been found hiding
in the school parking lot when she should have been in school). It is also important to note that the
burden is on the administrator to establish that a specific rule or law has been violated, and that a
search could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that violation. Id.
190. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985). The Court did not believe that it
was necessary to discuss or consider the circumstances in which school authorities may justify
conducting a search absent individualized suspicion. Id. The Court refrained from addressing this
issue for the prudential reason that because the search at issue had been based upon individualized
suspicion, the issue was not properly before the Court to address. Id. The vice-principal had
searched T.L.O.'s purse as a direct response to allegations that she had broken the school's
prohibition against smoking. Id.
191. Id. See supra notes 125-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of two employment
cases in which the Supreme Court, after quoting this same language, held that individualized
suspicion was not required to drug test employees.
192. Professor Schreck points out two types of searches that can raise the issue of
nonindividualized suspicion in the public school setting: "(1) when misconduct has occurred and
suspicion is directed toward a group of students, but not a specific individual; and (2) when the
school wishes to prevent misconduct by searching the general student population, although there is
no suspicion that any particular student has engaged in misconduct." Schreck, supra note 70, at
130-31. Courts have generally held that these types of searches are unconstitutional because the
"Fourth Amendment demands more than a generalized probability; it requires that the suspicion be
particularized with respect to each individual searched." Id. at 131 (quoting Kuehn v. Renton Sch.
Dist. No. 403, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Wash. 1985)). However, in an emergency situation the
"immediate and serious risk of harm could be determinative in balancing the interests at stake." Id.
Massmann: Drug Testing High School and Junior High School Students After Ve
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997
752 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
The only guidance to answer this question which the Court provided was
the statement that "exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are
minimal and where 'other safeguards' are available 'to assure that the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of
the official in the field. ' " '  The Court would further discuss the
individualized suspicion requirement in the next case it heard addressing the
Fourth Amendment standard in public schools, Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton. "9
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY MANDATORY,
RANDOM, SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Description of a Drug Testing Procedure
Before discussing the various cases challenging random, suspicionless drug
testing in public schools, an actual drug testing procedure will be described.
The description will prove helpful in understanding the constitutional
implications which these programs raise. 9' The procedures apply to all
students who wish to participate on an athletic team.196 The program requires
the athlete and his or her parent or guardian to sign a consent form agreeing that
the student will submit to urinalysis testing."9 All students are tested at the
beginning of the season for their sport, and again during the season if they are
selected by random drawing.' 98 If the athlete does not consent to the testing,
he or she is not eligible to participate.' 99
at 133 (quoting Burnham v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1987)).
193. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)).
194. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). See infra notes 294-361 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Acton case.
195. The drug testing program challenged in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct.
2386 (1995), is described below. Variations of the program will be pointed out by making reference
to the drug testing program challenged in SchailU v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
196. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
197. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J. 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Or. 1992). "All students
who desire to participate in interscholastic athletics are required to sign a form authorizing the
District to conduct a test on a urine specimen provided by the student as a prerequisite to
participation in the athletic program." Id.
198. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. If the student athlete or his or her parent or guardian refuses
to sign the consent form, the student athlete will be denied participation in the interscholastic
program. Id. at 2390.
199. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358. After refusing to sign the consent form James Acton was
given the first day of football practice, he was told not only by the school principal, but also the
school district superintendent, that he could not participate on the football team without signing the
consent form and submitting to drug testing. Id. at 1359.
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Once a week during the season a school official places the athletes' names
into a pool from which a student, with the supervision of two adults, blindly
draws the names of ten percent of the athletes for testing." The athlete is
then notified of his or her selection and tested the same day. The athlete reports
for testing and is given a specimen control form.2"' The form contains a
confidential number for identification purposes.' An opportunity for the
athlete to disclose prescription medications is provided at this time.2 3 The
athlete may either provide a copy of his or her prescription or a doctor's
authorization.'
An adult monitor of the same sex as the athlete then gives the athlete an
empty specimen bottle, and accompanies him or her into a locker room or
bathroom.2" The male athlete produces a sample at a urinal with his back to
the monitor.' Monitors may, though do not always, watch the student while
he produces the sample, and they listen for the normal sounds of urination.'
Female athletes produce samples in an enclosed bathroom stall, so that they can
be heard but not observed.s The athlete then gives the sample to the
monitor, who after checking it for temperature and tampering, transfers it to a
vial. 2' The student then places a lid on the vial, and the vial is sealed with
security tape which the student signs and dates.210 Finally, a school official
200. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. In Schaill, each student athlete was assigned a number instead
of being given a number once their name was drawn. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1310-11. The athletic
director and head coach of each athletic team were authorized to institute random urinalysis for drugs
during the athletic season. Id. at 1311. To select the student athletes to be tested their assigned
numbers were placed in a box and then randomly drawn. Id.
201. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995).
202. Id.
203. Id. In Schaill, if a sample tested positive the student was allowed an opportunity to
explain any false positive due to prescription drugs or over-the-counter medicine that had been taken.
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th Cir. 1988).
204. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995). "The monitor is present
to assure that there is no tampering and remains 12 to 15 feet behind the student." Acton v.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Or. 1992). In Schaill, the student athletes
selected to be tested were allowed to enter a lavatory stall and close the door in order to produce
the sample. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311.
The student is not under direct visual observation while producing the sample; however,
the water in the toilet is tinted to prevent the student from substituting water for the
sample, the monitor stands outside the stall to listen for normal sounds of urination and
the monitor checks the temperature of the sample by hand in order to assure its
genuineness.
Id.
208. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
209. Id.
210. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
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sends the sample to an independent laboratory where it is tested for the presence
of controlled substances or performance enhancing drugs.2 ' The chain of
custody of the sample is designed to ensure its authenticity." 2 Access to the
test results are strictly limited to protect the privacy and anonymity of the
athlete.
213
If the sample tests positive, the school administers a second test as soon as
possible to confirm the result.2 1' If the second test is positive, the school
notifies the athlete's parents. 2 5 The school then schedules a meeting with the
student, his or her parents, and the appropriate school officials to discuss the
options available to the student.216 Sanctions that may be imposed vary.21 7
Generally, upon the first positive test the school gives the athlete the choice of
entering an assistance program which includes counseling and weekly urinalysis,
or suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current season and the next
athletic season.218 Second and third positive test violations result in longer or
permanent suspensions from athletic competition.21 9
211. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. The laboratory routinely tests the samples for amphetamines,
cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. Id. Other drugs, such as LSD or anabolic steroids, may be
screened at the request of the school district, but the identity of a particular student does not
determine which drugs the sample will be tested for. Id. The test has an accuracy of approximately
99.94%. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
212. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th Cir. 1988).
213. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995). The laboratory does
not know the identity of the student athletes whose samples it tests, and it is authorized to mail the
results only to the superintendent or to provide the results to school district officials by telephone
only after a code confirming the official's authority is recited. Id. The only officials that have
access to the test results are the superintendent, principal, vice-principal, and athletic directors. Id.
Also, the test results are not kept for more than one year. Id.
214. Id. at 2390. In Schaill, the laboratory would retest any sample which tested positive using
the more accurate, and more expensive, gas chromatography/mass spectrometry method. Schaill,
864 F.2d at 1311.
215. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Or. 1992).
216. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
217. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
218. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. In Schaill, the sanction for the first positive test was an
automatic suspension from 30% of the athletic contests. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp.,
864 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th Cir. 1988).
219. A second positive test results in automatic suspension for the remainder of the current
season and the next athletic season, and a third positive test results in the suspension for the
remainder of the season and the next two athletic seasons. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115
S. Ct. 2386, 2390 (1995). In Schaill, the sanction for the second positive test result was a 50%
suspension from 30% of the athletic contests. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311. A third positive test result
created a suspension for a full calendar year, and a fourth positive barred the student athlete from
all interscholastic athletic competitions during the remainder of the student's high school career. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [1997], Art. 25
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss2/25
1997] STUDENT DRUG TESTING GUIDELINES 755
B. Drug Testing Student Athletes
The following discussion provides an analysis of the various issues raised
by drug testing student athletesYm  The overview of the leading cases
challenging student athlete drug testing will give the reader an overall picture of
the current case law. Next, the rationale for testing students athletes is briefly
discussed, followed by an in depth discussion of two important cases challenging
drug testing student athletes.
1. An Overview
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,"' the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of drug testing in public schools for the first time. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia concluded that suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes does not violate the students' constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches.' Until Acton, only one federal court had upheld
mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of public school students.
Relying on New Jersey v. T.L.0. ,0 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., held that randomly drug
testing high school student athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
court reasoned that the school's strong interest in drug testing outweighed the
athletes' expectations of privacy. However, other courts did not follow this case
until the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Acton."
In sharp contrast to the decision in Schaill, during the period after Schaill
and before Acton, courts consistently recognized student athletes' Fourth
Amendment right to be free from intrusive bodily searches.226 This protection
220. The focus of this section is on drug testing student athletes because this is the student
group that school districts have chosen to test.
221. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
222. Id.
223. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See supra notes 174-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the T.L.O. case.
224. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1989).
225. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2386.
226. Several courts have invalidated student drug testing for various reasons. Brooks v. East
Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that no
extraordinary circumstances existed to justify suspicionless testing, also noting the absence of
evidence that students who participate in extracurricular activities are much more likely to use drugs
than nonparticipants); Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (invalidating a drug
testing policy because of the unreliable test results and the procedure of visual monitoring of the act
of urination); Odenhein v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super
Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (holding drug testing policy unreasonably intrusive on privacy that could not be
justified by the numbers and percentages of students referred to drug counseling as compared to the
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was founded upon the more or less absolute privacy that our culture provides the
excretory functions.227 As the cases discussed below will demonstrate, this
privacy interest is no longer absolute.228
2. Athletes at Greater Risk
Before discussing the cases challenging drug testing in public schools in
greater detail, the rationale for focusing these programs on student athletes will
be addressed. Drug use by student athletes presents special concerns that either
do not exist among the general student population or are substantially increased
when combined with sports. 9  These special concerns center around the
dangerous combination of drugs and sports.
The student athlete's health and fitness is adversely affected by drug use to
a greater degree than non-athletic student drug use.' One of the contributing
total student body).
227. See supra notes 54-56, 77, 132-33, 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy
concerns implicated by compelled urinalysis).
228. See infra section III.C.
229. The compelling force of athletic competition alone can drive a student athlete to use drugs
to improve his or her performance and gain a competitive edge. See JEFF MEER, DRUGS & SPORTS
72 (Solomon H. Snyder ed., 1987) (stating "[tihe drive to excel and win sometimes becomes so
overwhelming that an athlete might do anything to obtain a slight advantage"). See generally TOM
DONOHOE & NEIL JOHNSON, FOUL PLAY: DRUG ABUSE IN SPORTS 147-50 (1986) (offering a
number of reasons why athletes use drugs).
The special problem of drug use in interscholastic sports stems from many sources. The most
prominent source can be traced to the position the professional athlete holds in modem American
culture. The mass media portrays popular professional athletes as cultural icons. These superstar
athletes are the modem day heroes to thousands of young athletes. See, eg., Jacob V. Lamar,
Scoring off the Field; The Penalty Flag Has Been Thrown for Drug Use Among Athletes, TIME, Aug.
25, 1986, at 52, 52 (stating that professional athletes are exalted role models that are treated as
American royalty). Many student athletes perceive excelling in sports as their avenue to power,
fame, and fortune. Even an average professional athlete in many sports earns more than $100,000
per year. BOB GOLDMAN ET AL., DEATH IN THE LOCKER ROOM: STEROIDS & SPORTS 32 (1984).
This cultural backdrop, combined with the inherent competitive nature of sports, places student
athletes at a greater risk than the general student body to use drugs. For an excellent account of
how important high school sports can become to an athlete, student, and community, see H.G.
BISSINGER, FRIDAY NIGHT LIGHTS: A TOWN, A TEAM, AND A DREAM (1990) (recounting the story
of the 1988 football season of the Permian Panthers from Odessa, Texas who regularly drew crowds
of 20,000 to see them play).
230. "The use of drugs by professional and college athletes has encouraged drug use by
younger athletes." Nancy A. Nuzzo & Donald P. Waller, Drug Abuse in Athletes, in DRUGS,
ATHLETES, AND PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE 141, 144 (John A. Thomas ed., 1988). Drug use among
younger athletes may have more serious consequences than adult drug use.
The young body frequently responds to pharmacological agents in a different or
modified way compared to the body of a mature adult. There are major physiological
changes occurring during adolescent development with an increased susceptibility to
drug alteration and damage. Bone growth, hormone surges, changes in cardiac function
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factors that places student athletes at greater risk is that they are more likely to
use more harmful drugs such as amphetamines and anabolic steroids.231 The
athlete's use of these types of drugs increase the risk of sports related
injuries.2 The effects of many drugs impair judgment, reaction, and
coordination, leading to injuries on the playing field to both the athlete using
drugs and other teammates or opponents.233 Thus, not only is the health and
safety of the athlete using drugs at risk, but also the health and safety of other
athletes.
In addition to focusing on the serious health risks posed by student athlete
drug use, school districts have chosen to test student athletes because of their
status within the school community.' Student athletes are prominent
are all part of the pubescent adolescent physiology. The abuse of drugs during these
important years of physiological development can cause unknown alterations in
physiological systems. The adolescent years are also very difficult psychologically.
Young athletes may become dependent upon abused drugs to maintain the self-image
that was originally built up by and attributed to the use of drugs.
Id. at 145.
231. One study indicated that amphetamine use by student athletes was three times greater than
that of the general student body. MICHAEL J. ASKEN, DYING TO WIN, THE ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO
SAFE AND UNSAFE DRUGS IN SPORTS 46 (1988). "The use of steroids in adolescents is far more
serious than in adults." Nuzzo & Waller, supra note 230, at 153. Adolescent use of steroids "can
also irreversibly affect the reproductive system of prepubertal males and females, causing permanent
infertility." Id. at 154. See also Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics,
1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 93 (1990) (discussing the physical effects of steroid use on the athlete and
why athletes are likely to use them). In addition to the immediate health risks caused by anabolic
steroid use, studies have shown a correlation between steroid use and other substance abuse. Robert
H. DuRant et al., Anabolic-Steroid Use, Strength Training, and Multiple Drug Use Among
Adolescents in the United States, PEDIATRICS, July 1995, at 23 (citing data compiled by researchers
from questionnaires of 12,267 teenagers). The study revealed that high school students who use
anabolic steroids are more likely to use several drugs and drink alcohol. Id.
232. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995). A Vernonia coach
believed that serious injuries to a wrestler and a football player were caused by drug use. Id. The
coach also expressed concern that many injuries may not be revealed. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992). This is because the student athlete is less likely to
disclose an injury than a student injured in a regular physical education class. Id. The coach
explained that the highly competitive atmosphere of interscholastic sports will influence the athlete's
decision to report an injury, whereas the student injured in physical education class is more likely
to disclose an injury. Id. "[The] sense of pride and desire to stay in the game, when coupled with
the numbing influence of drugs, [is] a significant concern to all involved in [an] athletic program."
Id.
233. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389. Expert testimony confirmed the deleterious effects of drugs
on motivation, memory, judgment, reaction, coordination and performance. Id. See generally
GARY I. WADLER & BRIAN HAINLINE, DRUGS AND THE ATHLETE 53-169 (1989) (providing an
exhaustive discussion of the adverse effects of numerous drugs used by athletes).
234. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 856 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (noting
that "interscholastic athletes of a public school system typically enjoy a unique identity within the
school community").
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members of the student body who are viewed with admiration and respect.2 5
This status places student athletes in a leadership role that gives them the power
to influence other students' behavior. 236 This leadership role transcends the
immediate school community to the community at large. 7  Accordingly, the
student athlete has a responsibility to uphold the school's image. 8  In fact,
one court has even taken judicial notice of the fact that drug use by athletes is
a matter of great concern in society at large.239
The prevalence of drug use among athletes also damages the integrity of
sports by eliminating its inherent fairness.' Performance enhancing drugs
give athletes using them an unfair advantage over athletes who do not use
them.24 Student athlete drug use further erodes the integrity of sports when
an athlete develops a drug dependency which leads to unethical practices such
as point-shaving, gambling, and bribery.242 Even more damaging to the
integrity of sports is the illegal drug market that has developed as a result of
athletes' drug dependency.243 All these factors combine to impair the integrity
of sports in general, and particularly the integrity of a school identified as
having a drug problem in its sports program.2" A combination of all these
concerns prompted the drug testing of student athletes in the following cases.
C. Two Cases Upholding Suspicionless Drug Testing
The following two cases provide the only case law upholding suspicionless
drug testing in public schools. Special attention should be given to the most
recent case because it was decided by the United States Supreme Court. Future
challenges to student drug testing will draw on this case for arguments both for
and against student drug testing. Thus, a complete analysis of these cases is
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Mary L. Scott, Note, Is Innocence Forever Gone? Drug Testing High School Athletes:
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corporation, 54 Mo. L. REV. 425, 440 (1989).
239. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1988).
240. Charles Feeney Knapp, Note, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the
Constitutional Challenge, 76 IOWA L. REv. 107, 113 (1990). "Sport is about honest competition."
DONOHOE & JOHNSON, supra note 229, at 152. "Either we accept this and persuade athletes to
forsake their tablets and syringes or we forget the honesty." Id. "With chemicals in the stadium it
is a rat race, not a human race." Id.
241. See, eg., Daniel Benjamin, Shame of the Games; Ben Johnson is Stripped of His Gold in
the Olympics' Worse Drug Scandal, TIME, Oct. 10, 1988, at 74, 74 (reporting that Ben Johnson was
stripped of his olympic gold medal and world record in the 100 meter sprint because he cheated by
using anabolic steroids).
242. Knapp, supra note 240, at 113-14.
243. Id. at 114.
244. Id.
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crucial to determine whether their rationale and reasoning can be extended to
allow schools to drug test other students besides those participating in athletics.
1. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.245
In Schaill, five out of sixteen high school baseball players ordered to
produce urine samples tested positive for the presence of marijuana.2" Based
on these results, other reports of drug use among student athletes, and a concern
over the high incidence of drug use among high school students nationwide, the
Tippecanoe County School Corporation (TCSC) instituted random urine testing
for all student athletes. 47 Two sophomores who wanted to join an athletic
team but refused to consent to drug testing filed suit in district court to prevent
the program from being implemented.248 The district court rejected the
students' claims249 and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.'e
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit followed the lead of several federal courts
recognizing that urine testing is a search against which the Fourth Amendment
protects. 251 Next, the court turned to the more difficult question presented by
random drug testing: the level of suspicion required before a school district may
conduct such testing.52 The court believed that this question had already been
245. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
246. Id. at 1310. The McCutcheon High School baseball coach ordered these sixteen baseball
players to provide urine samples based on information that members of the team were possibly using
drugs. Id.
247. Id. Cheerleaders were also included in the drug testing scheme. Id. TCSC operates
Harrison and McCutcheon High Schools in Indiana. Id. See supra section III.A for a description
of the specific drug testing procedures followed in Acton and Schaill.
248. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 835 (N.D. Ind. 1988). The
students argued that the program 1) violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures; 2) interfered with their legitimate expectations of privacy; 3)
violated their right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; 4) violated their right
to equal protection guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment; 5) and violated the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions by forcing them to waive their right to be free from unreasonable
searches in return for the privilege of participating in interscholastic sports. Id. at 848. See Scott,
supra note 238, at 427 (listing the grounds on which the students attacked the drug testing program).
249. Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 835.
250. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1309.
251. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d. 1309, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988).
252. Id. The court noted that this determination requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 703(1983)). The court further elaborated on this balancing test stating that "[c]ourts must
consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification
for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted" to decide whether a particular search is
reasonable. Id. at 1313 n.3 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 599 (1979)).
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answered by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.21
3
The court interpreted the holding in T.L.O. broadly enough to bring the
school's mission to teach students in a safe and secure learning environment
within the special needs exception." 4 However, not only did the challenged
testing program bypass the warrant and probable cause requirements, the
program also permitted testing in the absence of individualized suspicion. 25
Recall that in T.L.O. the Supreme Court expressly reserved deciding whether
individualized suspicion was necessary to validate a search under the reason-
ableness standard adopted in that case." 6 Thus, the Schaill court could not
rely on its broad interpretation of the T.L. 0. standard to justify the drug testing
program's absence of individualized suspicion. Instead, the court drew from the
administrative search cases" 7  to articulate four principles to allow
suspicionless testing." 8
The first principle stated that suspicionless searches are more likely to be
allowed when an individual has diminished expectations of privacy.,
Applying this principle to the drug testing policy at issue, the court noted that
253. Id. at 1314-15. For a discussion of the Fourth Amendment standard in public schools set
out in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), see supra notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
254. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314-15. This broad interpretation of the T.L.O. holding defeated
the students' argument that the holding only applied "in those cases .. . based solely on the need
for swift, or even immediate, responses to violations of a school's . . . rules." Id. at 1314. The
court rejected this argument noting that the Supreme Court was not merely concerned with the time
required to obtain a warrant; rather, the Court was concerned that a warrant requirement would
unnecessarily impede the purposes of the classroom. Id.
255. Id. at 1315.
256. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
257. The court summarized the important factors the Supreme Court has stressed when
approving administrative searches absent individualized suspicion in the business context as
follows:
In industries subject to pervasive regulation, a business owner has a diminished expectation
of privacy and has, to some extent, impliedly consented to inspections through his or her
voluntary decision to enter a regulated industry. Second, the regulatory scheme which
authorizes the search must further substantial governmental interests. Third, warrantless,
suspicionless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; the government
must demonstrate that imposition of a warrant or reasonable suspicion requirement would
frustrate the purposes of the regulatory scheme. Finally, the statutory or regulatory program
authorizing the warrantless entry must specify the circumstances in which a search is
appropriate with such particularity that the business owner is adequately advised that a
particular search is lawful and the inspecting officer's discretion is limited sufficiently to guard
against the danger of searches instituted primarily for harassment or intimidation.
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1317 (7th Cir. 1988).
258. Id. at 1317-18.
259. Id. at 1317. Expanding on this principle the court stated that "lain individual's privacy
rights vary with the context-whether the individual is at home, at work, in school or in jail, in a
car or on a public sidewalk." Id.
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a substantial expectation of privacy generally surrounds the act of urination.' 60
However, the court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the testing
procedures mitigated this expectation of privacy.2 61 Of particular importance,
the court noted that the absence of direct observation while the student produced
the sample rendered the invasion of privacy less severe than if the monitor
directly observed the student urinating.2 The court also placed great
significance on its finding that students participating in an interscholastic athletic
program generally have a diminished expectation of privacy.263 Several
factors led the court to make this conclusion. First, the element of "communal
undress" inherent in athletic participation suggested to the court that athletes
have a reduced expectation of privacy.26 Further, athletes had long been
required to produce a urine sample as part of a mandatory preseason medical
examination. 2" The court also noted the extensive requirements placed upon
participation in interscholastic athletics, including minimum grade point
averages, residency and eligibility requirements, and training rules.2" Finally,
the court considered the athletes' implied consent to drug testing. 267 The court
260. Id. at 1318.
261. Id.
262. Id. Cf. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2389 (1995) (noting that the
drug testing procedures allowed the monitor to watch the male student athlete produce the urine
sample).
263. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. These training rules included "prohibitions on smoking, drinking and drug use both
on and off school premises." Id. These type of training rules have been upheld by numerous
courts. See, eg., Clements v. Board of Educ. of Decatur Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 61, 478 N.E.2d 1209
(I11. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding a high school athlete's suspension from interscholastic sports
competition for attending a party where alcohol was served to minors); Braesch v. DePasquale, 265
N.W.2d 842 (Neb. 1978) (upholding a training rule prohibiting student athletes from smoking,
drinking, or using drugs both on and off school premises).
267. SchaiUl, 864 F.2d at 1319. The drug testing program required all students participating
in interscholastic athletics to sign a consent form permitting the collection and testing of their urine.
Id. The court noted that while this consent did not render the testing procedure any less of a search,
it did factor into the balancing test to determine whether the search was reasonable. Id. Because
the refusal to sign a consent form did not result in loss of employment, criminal penalty, or any
academic penalty, the court concluded that it was reasonable to require a student athlete to consent
to drug testing. Id. at 1319-20. The court also pointed out that the consent form put the students
on notice that they may be tested, and informed the student of the manner in which the testing would
be conducted. Id. at 1320. The court also characterized participation in interscholastic athletic
programs as a benefit that provided the participating student enhanced prestige and status in the
student community. Id. The fact that the student could avoid the search entirely by choosing not
to participate in interscholastic athletic programs also factored into the court's analysis of the consent
issue. Id. at 1319 n. 11. While this factor weighed in favor of the reasonableness of the search, the
court warned "that a considerably greater intrusion occurs where an individual has no realistic option
but to submit to a search." Id. An example of this situation is when drug testing is made a
condition of employment. Id. at 1319-20. However, the court distinguished the drug testing as a
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concluded that the combination of these factors diminished the student athletes'
expectations of privacy with respect to urine tests.2 s
The second principle the court announced requires a school to have a
substantial interest in drug testing that could not be accomplished by less
intrusive means. 69 Addressing the school's interest in drug testing, the court
noted that five out of sixteen positive test results were consistent with national
and statewide statistics of high school student drug use.' The particular
harm that drug use can cause athletes, and the leadership status athletes enjoy,
were also factors the court considered when assessing the legitimacy of the
school's interest in drug testing."'
The court found that alternative methods of investigation would not
adequately serve the school's interest in detecting and deterring drug use. 272
The appellants argued that the school environment provided an ideal situation for
a suspicion based testing scheme. The daily contact between teachers,
administrators, coaches and students would allow school officials to select
students based on visible signs of drug impairment or intoxication. 3  While
such a testing scheme may be feasible in the public school environment, it is not
likely to have the deterrent effect of a random test. 74 In short, the court
concluded that drug testing was a reasonable method to deal with a serious threat
to the school's learning environment.27'
condition of employment situation to conclude that the consensual aspect of the drug testing at issue
was important to the determination of the constitutionality of the program. Id. at 1320.
268. Id. at 1319.
269. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988). The
court also stated "[tihat alternative investigative techniques would not deter unlawful conduct to the
same extent as the challenged practice may also be a relevant consideration." Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 1320. The statistics the court relied upon indicated that in 1980, 63% of the high
school seniors in Indiana had tried marijuana, and 37% used marijuana at least once a week. Id.
A 1986 national survey indicated that 23% of the high school seniors responding to the survey had
used marijuana in the preceding month. Id.
271. Id. at 1320-21. See supra section Il.B.2 (discussing the particular harm drug use causes
athletes and the high school athlete's leadership role in the school community).
272. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320-21.
273. Id. at 1321.
274. Id. Detecting and deterring drug use were not the only goals of the program. Id. The
program not only attempted to protect the health and safety of the students, but also attempted to
provide an appropriate learning environment. Id. Thus, the court distinguished the present case
from others cases in which courts placed significant emphasis on the fact that urinalysis does not
effectively measure current impairment. Id. at 1321 n. 16. See, eg., Lovvom v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1548 (6th Cir. 1988).
275. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th Cir. 1988).
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The third principle can be categorized as a requirement that the discretion
of the searching party be limited. 6  The court observed that this principle
serves several important functions. 2 7 The possibility of arbitrary searches,
or searches meant to harass or intimidate, is diminished by clearly articulated,
objective criteria. 278  Also, articulated selection criteria assures the individuals
to be searched that the searching party is acting within his or her lawful
authority.2 79  Finally, an established criteria tends to diminish the subjective
intrusiveness of a search because the individual understands why he or she is
being searched. 2 °  The court found that the drug testing program provided
these safeguards.28'
Finally, the fourth principle the court set out to determine the validity of
warrantless, suspicionless drug testing was whether the school intended to
discover evidence of criminal activity. 2n The court summarily addressed this
principle noting that the school did not intend the program as a means to punish
students; rather, the program emphasized rehabilitation, affecting only the
student's eligibility for participation in interscholastic athletics.' The
program did not assess academic penalties. After balancing these four
principles, the court concluded that the suspicionless search was permissible. 281
The court also discussed the due process aspects of drug testing public
school students. 2' The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government from
276. Id. at 1318.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. This procedure safeguards against individuals feeling that they are the target of a
search conducted for improper motives. Id.
281. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1988). The
program did not allow the school officials to exercise any discretion regarding choosing who would
be tested. Id. The athletes were selected randomly, and specific provisions controlled the manner
in which the samples were collected, the handling and testing of the samples, and the confirmation
of the results. Id. at 1321. The students were also fully advised of these procedures to eliminate
any element of surprise, and the selection criteria was published to prevent a student from being
stigmatized among his or her peers when selected for testing. Id. at 1321-22. The court concluded
that these procedures provided "adequate safeguards to assure that reasonable expectations of privacy
[were] not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Id. at 1321.
282. Id. at 1318. "A search conducted for civil or non-punitive purposes may be valid in
circumstances where a search conducted as part of a criminal investigation would not be
permissible." Id.
283. Id. at 1322. The progressive nature of the sanctions and the drug counselling program
as an option to reduce the length of suspension demonstrated the program's emphasis on
rehabilitation over punishment. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1323-24.
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depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.2  If a student has a liberty interest in participating on an athletic
team2 ' then a drug testing scheme must provide the student procedural due
process.2s
In the context of drug testing students, procedural due process requires that
the proceedings and procedures provide the students with "fundamental
fairness. "2M This requirement necessarily entails that the school give the
students advance notice of the testing procedures, that the testing is reliable, and
that the school provide an opportunity to rebut the charges at a meeting with
school officials. 2' The court held that the TCSC policy comported with these
286. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
287. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1323 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting
"that there is room for doubt whether a student athlete has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in being free of the potential stigma associated with removal from an athletic team"). "Courts have
not agreed regarding procedural protections that must be provided when students face suspension
or expulsion from extracurricular activities." MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & NELDA H. CAMBRON-
MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 127 (3d ed. 1992). See, e.g.,
Niles v. University Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a student's
interest in participating in interscholastic athletics is not a protected interest under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Boyd v. Board of Dirs. of the McGehee Sch. Dist. No.
17, 612 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that students could not be suspended from a high
school football team without due process protection because the students have a property interest in
participating on the team). However, "[w]hile school authorities may not be constitutionally
required to provide due process under all circumstances involving the denial of extracurricular
participation, a hearing for the affected students to explain their version of the situation is always
advisable." MCCARTHY & CAMBRON-MCCABE, supra, at 127.
288. In the public school setting a rudimentary due process standard exists. 2 JAMES A. RAPP,
EDUCATION LAW § 9.05 (1992) (discussing student disciplinary procedures). "At the very
minimum, however, due process requires that when a protected interest is to be affected that a
student be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Id. at 9.05[2][b], at 9-
100.1. The Supreme Court has defined this rudimentary due process standard regarding suspensions
from school of 10 days or less. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, the Court held that
procedural due process requires that before a student is suspended the student must be given "oral
or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Id. at 581. See generally
WHAT WORKS, supra note 12, at 55-57 (setting out procedural guidelines for student suspension and
expulsion).
289. Knapp, supra note 240, at 127.
290. Id. See also Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1323 (summarizing that procedural due process requires
that a student should be given notice and the opportunity to be heard).
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requirements.29 ' The policy provided the students adequate notice of the
testing procedures, accurate test reliability, and an opportunity to have their
urine samples tested a third time at a laboratory of their choice. 29 ,  These
safeguards provided all of the process that is due in the school setting.
293
2. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton294
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,2 the Supreme Court addressed
drug testing public school students for the first time.2% Many school districts
eagerly anticipated the Court's decision in this case. The conflicting federal
court decisions made the Court's determination particularly important. The
Court's ruling would resolve the split between the lower courts and hopefully
set a uniform standard for the country.
The Court decided Acton some time after the development of the special
needs exception2" and the approval of suspicionless drug testing in the
employment cases .298 Thus, the Court had a substantially larger body of case
law to form the basis of its decision than the Schaill court did when it faced the
same issue. Drawing from these cases, the Court ultimately held that the
school's drug testing program passed the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
test.299
James Acton, a twelve-year-old seventh grade student, signed up to play
football for Washington Grade School in the Fall of 1991.' The first day of
practice James was given the school district's consent form for alcohol and drug
testing."' James took the form home, and after discussing it with his parents,
decided not to sign it.' James and his parents objected to the policy because
it required James to submit to drug testing absent any evidence that he had used
drugs or alcohol.' The school district superintendent informed James that
he could not participate on the football team without signing the consent form
291. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1323; see also Knapp, supra note 240, at 126-27 (concluding that
a due process challenge to student athlete drug testing is not judicially sustainable).
292. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1323.
293. Goss, 419 U.S. at 565 (discussing due process in the school setting).
294. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See supra section II.C (discussing the development of the special needs exception).
298. See supra notes 125-73 and accompanying text (discussing the approval of suspicionless
drug testing in the employment context).
299. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396-97.
300. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D. Or. 1992).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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and submitting to drug testing.'t  James' parents then filed a lawsuit in
federal district court on his behalf.
The district court drew from the principles set out in New Jersey v.
T.L.0. 3 6 and Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.'° to hold that the
program was constitutional.' The court described Vernonia as a small rural
community in which interscholastic sports played a dominant role, and which
faced a serious drug problem within its public schools.3 After previous
efforts to curb student drug use failed, the school board approved and
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1356. The lawsuit sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. The Actons claimed
that the drug testing policy violated their son's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. Id. The purpose of this
note is to provide guidelines for school districts to implement a drug testing policy that will pass
constitutional muster under the United States Constitution. Thus, this note will not discuss specific
state constitutional arguments.
306. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). See supra notes 174-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the New Jersey v. T.L.O. case.
307. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 245-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. case.
308. Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (D. Or. 1992).
309. Id. at 1356. The record indicated that interscholastic sports were the major source of
entertainment in the small logging community. Id. Witnesses testified that because entertainment
opportunities were limited in Vemonia, interscholastic sports played a dominant role in the
community and that the student athletes were well known and admired. Id. See BISSINGER, supra
note 229 for a discussion of the importance of interscholastic sports in a small community and the
admiration and respect student athletes in such a community receive. The record also indicated that
approximately 60-65% of the Vernonia high school students and 75% of the elementary school
students participated in school sponsored athletics. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356.
Teachers and school officials testified that discipline and drug use was not a problem in the
Vernonia public schools until the mid-to-late 1980s. Id. At that point school officials noticed a
sharp increase in student drug and alcohol use. Id. As the drug problem escalated, classroom
discipline problems increased. Id. The discipline problems became so bad that one teacher with
15 years of experience was ready to quit. Id. She was frustrated with her inability to deal with the
discipline problems that had never existed in the Vernonia schools. Id. The grade school princpal
launched an investigation into the problem. Id. The investigation revealed that the glamorization
and use of drugs and alcohol had become widespread: students bragged about drug use, classroom
discipline suffered, students wrote essays glorifying the use of drugs, groups were formed within
the student drug culture with names such as the "Drug Cartel," drug paraphernalia was confiscated
on school grounds, and school officials observed students openly using drugs at a local cafe across
the street from the high school. Id. at 1356-57.
The drug problem also invaded the sports program. Id. at 1357. Numerous incidents of drug
and alcohol use were documented. Id. Students were caught drinking alcohol on a school bus after
a game and others were caught stealing alcohol from a store after a track meet. Id. Coaches
testified that they suspected injuries to several football players and a wrestler were caused by the
athletes' drug use. Id. The wrestling coach even smelled marijuana in the hotel room of the injured
wrestler. Id. At trial, a doctor explained the enhanced risk of injury that athletes using drugs or
alcohol are exposed to. Id. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text (discussing the health
risks resulting from mixing sports and drugs).
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implemented a random drug testing policy"' covering student athletes. 31'
The court relied on a growing body of case law312 to find a compelling
need to conduct a search without a warrant or individualized suspicion. 3' 3 The
unique setting in which the testing took place was a significant factor the court
considered to decide that a compelling need to test existed. 1 4 Thus, the court
determined that the testing policy was reasonable after balancing all the relative
310. See supra section III.A for a description of the testing procedures implemented in the
Vernonia schools.
311. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358. After the initial investigation, the school attempted to
address the drug problem through education. Id. at 1357. Special classes were held, special
speakers were invited to the school, seminars were offered, and theatrical presentations were given.
Id. These programs attempted to educate the students about the dangerous effects and addictive
nature of drugs. Id. However, these efforts failed to deter student drug use. Id. In fact, the day
after a special presentation addressing the evils of drug use, several sophomore athletes were caught
cutting class and arrested for using intoxicants. Id. Even the presence of a specially trained dog
that sniffed for drugs in the locker area did not significantly deter the students from using drugs.
Id. The court stated that these efforts to deter student drug use demonstrated that the school
administration was "at its wits end." Id. "Thus, random drug urinalysis was seen as the next
logical step in a progressive attempt to address the drug and alcohol problems." Id. at 1364.
The school board decided to focus the testing on student athletes because through the
investigation it had become clear that the leaders of the drug culture that had developed in the
student community were also the leading student athletes. Id. at 1357. The court stated that "the
very center of activity of the school and the community was endangered" by the fact that the student
athletes were the leaders of the drug culture. Id. The school board was concerned that the leading
athletes' behavior would have a negative impact on the entire student community, especially the
younger students who would emulate the older students. Id. No evidence was presented to contest
the prevalence of drug use among the students nor the conclusions the school board reached that the
problem had lead to increased classroom discipline problems. Id.
312. See supra notes 118-73 and accompanying text.
313. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1361. While the compelling needs found to justify suspicionless
searches in the employment context involved serious national security or public safety concerns, the
court found that the unique public school setting allowed the "easing" of Fourth Amendment
restrictions. Id.
314. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Or. 1992). The court
distinguished the truly compelling national security and safety interests found in the employment
cases by falling back on the Supreme Court's statement in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985), that the public school is a unique setting in which the constraints of the Fourth Amendment
are "relaxed." The court stated:
Thus, although student athletes who use drugs do not pose the magnitude of a threat to society
that, say, an intoxicated air traffic controller might, the fact that the searches take place within
the school setting, as part of a program designed to maintain discipline, enforce athletic
program regulations, and protect the safety of student athletes, is a significant factor that must
weigh heavily in any balancing process.
Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1361.
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interests,3 5 distinguishing numerous cases holding drug testing students
unconstitutional,316 and ultimately following the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.
317
315. The court found several factors relevant in making its determination that the school's
interest in testing outweighed the students' privacy interests. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363. The
following are the factors the court focused upon: (1) the specific instances of drug use and drug
related injuries the coaches and teachers observed; (2) the student athletes' status as role models in
the community; (3) the deterrent effect a random drug testing program has on a youthful population;
(4) the limited scope and purpose of the drug test; (5) the fact that alternative methods of dealing
with the drug problem had been attempted and failed; (6) the steps taken to limit the intrusion of the
students' privacy in the testing procedure; (7) the accuracy of the testing procedure; and (8) the
limited discretion in the selection of students to be tested. Id. at 1363-64.
316. In Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, 832 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), and Hill
v. NCAA, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990., two similar drug testing schemes for intercollegiate athletes
were struck down as unreasonable searches. The Acton court distinguished these cases on the
grounds that college students for the most part have reached the age of majority, the university
setting is far less structured than public middle school and high school, and the role of athletics on
a large university is much different than that of a rural school. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1364 n.7.
The Acton court also distinguished two cases that more closely resembled the fact pattern
before the court. Id. at 1363-64. In Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School
District, 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989), the court held that a drug testing policy requiring all
students participating in any extracurricular activity to submit to drug testing was unconstitutional.
Id. at 766. The court reasoned that the program was unconstitutional because the testing procedures
were not effective due to laxed enforcement, and because of the lack of evidence demonstrating the
connection between drug use, participation in extracurricular activities, and injury. Id. at 764-65.
The Acton court distinguished Brooks on its facts. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363. The court reasoned
that "[u]nike the policy challenged in Brooks, which applied random drug testing to all extra-
curricular activities, the Vernonia policy [was] limited to the one activity which, in that community,
[was] likely to have the greatest impact on the drug and alcohol abuse problem .... I d.
InAnable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 40-41 (W.D. Ark. 1985), the court found the drug testing
of individual students suspected of using marijuana unconstitutional because the test results were not
reliable and the evidence was not sufficient to justify the intrusive procedures. The Acton court
distinguished Anable by pointing to the fact that the testing procedures implemented by the Vernonia
schools were highly effective and had an accuracy of 99.94%. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1364.
317. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 245-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. case which upheld a suspicionless drug
testing scheme requiring all student athletes to submit to random testing.
It is interesting to note that even at the district court level the court emphasized the limited
application of its holding relating to future cases challenging drug testing students in public schools.
Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1364. The court limited its holding to the unique facts before it. Id. Those
unique facts included the well documented drug problem, the previous less intrusive measures taken
to resolve the problem, and the predominant role that athletics played in the small rural Vernonia
community. Id. The court would not speculate whether a similar program would withstand a
constitutional challenge in a large metropolitan school or even other small rural schools. Id. at
1364-65. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would also make a similar reservation even
after reversing the district court's ruling. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526
(9th Cir. 1994). There, the court explained the "contours and outer limits" of its holding. Id. The
court specifically stated that it did not conclude that "there could never be a case where a random
search would be appropriate in a school setting." Id. The dicta in these cases further demonstrates
the need for a uniform set of guidelines due to the ad hoc, case by case analysis courts must make
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [1997], Art. 25
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss2/25
1997] STUDENT DRUG TESTING GUIDELINES 769
James and his parents appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.3"' The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and held that
the program was unconstitutional." 9 The court did not find that the school
had a compelling need to test the students, or that the student athletes had a
diminished expectation of privacy. 31 The court found that the school's goals
of preventing athletic injuries, reducing student drug use, and improving
discipline were not the kinds of dangers that supported a suspicionless testing
scheme.32' The court also found that James' privacy interests were not
when determining the constitutionality of a particular drug testing scheme.
318. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1514.
319. Id. at 1527.
320. Id. at 1525-26. The court acknowledged that the constitutionality of the drug testing
scheme would be determined by balancing numerous factors. Id. at 1521. The factors the court
proceeded to balance were those set out in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse,
the Supreme Court articulated a four part balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a
random, suspicionless search. Id. The four factors were as follows: (1) the importance of the
governmental interest; (2) the degree of physical or psychological intrusion on the individual's
rights; (3) the amount of discretion the official conducting the search has over the procedure; and
(4) the effectiveness and necessity of the procedure in reaching its goals. Id. at 653-63.
The Ninth Circuit found that the Vernonia drug testing policy met the last two factors. Acton,
23 F.3d at 1522. The policy met the third factor because the random selection methods gave the
school no discretion to determine which athletes would be tested. Id. The program was also
effective. Id. Student drug use decreased and the Vernonia teachers reported improvements in
classroom discipline. Id. However, the court stated that these results only weighed slightly in favor
of the drug testing program because the "exact nature of the goal [of the program] [was] not entirely
clear." Id. "If the goal was to avoid athletic injuries, testing of athletes was certainly a good way
to approach that problem." Id. "If the goal was to reduce drug use in the student body in general,
testing athletes seem[ed] to be a considerably more roundabout way of reaching that goal." Id.
While the court expressed concern that random testing was necessary to reach the school's goal, it
found that the program's efficiency weighed in favor of the policy. Id.
One commentator has argued that the Ninth Circuit erred by conceding the necessity of the
suspicionless drug testing program to reach the school's goals of preventing athletic injuries and
improving school discipline. Robert C. Farley, Jr., Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-
Suspicionless, Random Urinalysis: The Unreasonable Search of the Student Athlete, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 439, 440 (1995). Mr. Farley argues that the district court "should have engaged in a more
fact-specific analysis and determined the exact goal of the school district." Id. at 456. Because the
school's exact goal was not defined, the court could not determine whether the drug testing policy
was necessary to attain its goals. Id. Even assuming the goal of the policy was to remedy both of
the school's concerns, Mr. Farley argues that the policy was not necessary because several other less
intrusive means were available to further the school's goals. Id. at 457. The three alternatives to
the Vernonia drug testing policy Mr. Farley suggests all advocate a suspicion-based testing scheme.
Id. The rationale for such a scheme is the familiarity between athletes and coaches and students and
teachers. Id. Thus, Mr. Farley concludes that the Ninth Circuit, although reaching the correct
decision in the case, should have found that the drug testing policy failed the fourth part of the
Prouse balancing test. Id.
321. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1526. The court reasoned that the extreme dangers and hazards
involved in the employment cases that allowed suspicionless testing were not present in the Vemonia
schools. Id. See supra note 171 (discussing the public safety concerns courts have found
compelling). The court did not dispute that the school's goals were not worthy, only that they did
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diminished because he chose to participate in athletics. 3' In sum, after
balancing the school's interests in testing against James' expectations of privacy,
the court concluded that the drug testing program was unconstitutional.323 The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Acton directly conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. ,324 which addressed the
same issue. 32 Thus, the Supreme Court heard the case to resolve the
conflicting decisions.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that the Vemonia drug
testing policy was reasonable and hence constitutional.326 The Court made this
determination by balancing the policy's intrusion on the students' Fourth
Amendment interests against the school's legitimate interests in drug testing.327
After reiterating the familiar exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements, the Court discussed the nature of the students' privacy interests
not reach the level of compelling need to bypass the individualized suspicion requirement inherent
in the Fourth Amendment. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1526. The court stated that "[hlaving uncaring,
disrespectful, drug-impaired children in our schools is tragic." Id. "However, it is not the type of
potential disaster that has caused the [Supreme] Court or us to find a governmental interest
compelling enough to permit suspicionless testing." Id. The court explained that "[tihe prospect
that an athlete might hurt himself or a competitor is real enough, but it is not a risk of the same
magnitude as an airplane or train wreck, or a gas pipeline or nuclear power plant disaster." Id. The
court simply did not find that the school's concerns carried the possibility of grave disaster or
tragedy. Id.
322. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1526. The court began its analysis of the students' expectations of
privacy by noting that while children are compelled to attend school, "nothing suggests that they lose
their right to privacy in their excretory functions when they do so." Id. at 1525. The court also
discredited the analogy drawn between the diminished expectations of privacy of employees working
in highly regulated industries and the privacy expectations of student athletes. Id. at 1527. The
court concluded that student athletes' privacy interests remain "robust." Id. at 1525. The court
reasoned that the risks associated with regulated industries simply do not exist in the context of
school athletics. Id. The student athletes' lives, nor the lives of others, do not depend upon the
athletes' ability to perform their roles on the football team. Id. The court also addressed the
contention that conditions in the locker room where student athletes shower and disrobe diminish
their expectations of privacy. Id. The court stated that "[n]onnal locker room or restroom activities
are a far cry from having an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the results of one's
urination."
323. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994).
324. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 245-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. case which upheld a suspicionless drug
testing scheme requiring all student athletes to submit to random testing.
325. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1527. The Ninth Circuit specifically stated that it disagreed with the
Seventh Circuit decision in Schaill and criticized it for "minimiz[ing) the privacy interests of
students." Id.
326. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995).
327. Id. at 2390. While the Court characterized the balancing test as only containing two
prongs, within those two prongs the Court proceeded to balance the four principles set out in Schaill
v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988), to allow suspicionless testing.
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the policy intruded upon.328
The Court focused on the context in which the drug testing occurred to
determine the nature of the students' privacy interests.329 Central to this
determination was the fact that the subjects of the drug testing policy were
children who had been temporarily committed to the custody of the state in its
role as schoolmaster. 3" Thus, the Court stated that the reasonableness inquiry
must take into account "the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children. "33' Examples of schools meeting this responsibility are requirements
that students submit to physical examinations and be vaccinated against various
328. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390-91. The Court's summary of the Fourth Amendment standard
regarding suspicionless searches provided the first clue that the Court would conclude that the drug
testing program was constitutional. Id. The Court emphasized the language of the special needs
exception and explicitly acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of individualized suspicion. Id.
329. Id. at 2391. The Fourth Amendment only protects subjective expectations of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable. Id. The determination of what expectations are legitimate varies
with context, such as "whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work, in
a car, or in a public park." Id.
330. Id. While the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985), "rejected the
notion that public schools, like private schools, exercise only parental power over their students,"
the Court did emphasize that the "nature of [the] power is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree
of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391-
92. "[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as
the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an
adult." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
331. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. It is interesting to note that while the Court is willing to allow
schools greater control over students because of "the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility,"
this same responsibility does not give rise to a constitutional "duty to protect" students. Id. In fact,
the Court expressly stated that "we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a general matter
have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty to protect,'" Id.
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). A
recent commentator stated that the Court's "passing reference to Deshaney raises significant
questions regarding the proper reading of that decision." Drug Testing-Student Athletes, 109
HARv. L. REv. 220, 226 (1995). "In Deshaney, the Court rejected the argument that a state could
acquire an affirmative duty, enforceable under the Due Process Clause, to protect a child from harm
at the hands of a private actor simply because the state had represented repeatedly that it would
protect the child." Id.
The Court thus asserts what appears to be a self-contradiction: although no
custodial relationship exists that would give rise to an affirmative duty to protect under
DeShaney, a custodial relationship does exist for the purpose of justifying enhanced
search and seizure powers in Vernonia .... [I]f the Court intends to apply DeShaney
faithfully, it faces a dilemma of its own creation: by extending the state's control over
students, it edges toward a result whereby the state exercises so much control as to give
rise to a constitutional duty to protect those students.
Id. at 227. See also John W. Walters, Note, The Constitutional Duty of Teachers to Protect
Students: Employing the "Sufficient Custody" Test, 83 Ky. L.J. 229 (1995) (proposing a "sufficient
custody" test as a means to determine whether a constitutional duty to protect arises in the public
school environment).
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diseases.332 Therefore, the Court concluded that with regard to medical
examinations and procedures "students within the school environment have a
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. " "
Addressing the expectations of the particular group of students singled out for
testing by the school's policy, the Court concluded that student athletes'
legitimate expectations of privacy are even less than those all students enjoy.3
The Court attributed this diminished expectation of privacy to the element of
'communal undress" inherent in athletic participation and the rules and
regulations student athletes voluntarily follow. 35
Next, the Court considered the character of the intrusion the drug testing
policy caused. 3" The degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which
the urine sample is produced. 3 7 The Court concluded that the procedures the
testing policy followed in collecting the urine sample adequately safeguarded the
students' privacy interests. 338  The Court also addressed the privacy
implications created by requiring the students to disclose private medical
information. 3 9  The Court found that this invasion of privacy was not
significant because the authorized tests only looked for drug use, and the
students consented to releasing any information regarding their prescription
medications.'
332. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392 (1995).
333. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985)).
334. Id. Justice Scalia stated that because "[slchool sports are not for the bashful" student
athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy. Id. One of the reasons Justice Scalia asserts that
student athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy is the conditions surrounding public school
locker rooms. Id. at 2392-93. Because student athletes regularly change and shower in an area "not
notable for the privacy [it] afford[s]," student athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy. Id.
335. Id. at 2393. The Court also drew an analogy between student athletes and adults who
choose to participate in a closely regulated industry to substantiate its determination that because
students voluntarily participate in school athletics, they have reason to expect intrusions upon normal
rights and privileges, including privacy. Id. But see United States Supreme Court Respondent's
Brief at 34, Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No. 94-590) (arguing that
the rules and regulations student athletes voluntarily comply with "are not the sort of extensive
government regulation that has been found to diminish the expectation of privacy of workers in high
risk industries or high security areas of the government") (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J,
23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994)).
336. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
337. Id.
338. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995). The Court even stated
that the students' privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine samples were
negligible. Id. See supra section lI.A for a description of the testing procedures.
339. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
340. Id. at 2393-94. The Court found it significant that positive test results were not disclosed
to law enforcement authorities or used for any disciplinary function. Id. at 2393. The Court also
suggested that to avoid requiring the students to disclose prescription medications to school officials
the school could allow the student to disclose that information directly to the testing lab along with
the sample in a sealed envelope. Id. at 2394.
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Finally, the Court considered the nature and immediacy of the school's
interest in drug testing. 4  Both of the courts below had conceded that the
school district must demonstrate a compelling interest before suspicionless
testing would be allowed.2 The Supreme Court did not agree with the lower
court's characterization of the phrase "compelling state interest." 3 3  The
Court explained that the phrase did not describe a "fixed, minimum quantum of
governmental concern."' Rather, the Court stated that "the phrase describes
an interest which appears important enough to justify the particular search at
hand, in light of other factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive
upon a genuine expectation of privacy. " " Building upon this language, the
Court ultimately set the standard for evaluating school searches to pose the
question "whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might
undertake."' After balancing the school's important interest in drug testing
against the students' diminished expectations of privacy, the Court concluded
that the school's actions were reasonable. 47
341. Id.
342. Id. See supra section II.C (discussing the special needs exception).
343. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
344. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2394 (1995).
345. Id. at 2394-95.
346. Id. at 2397. This standard is essentially the same as the one originally set out for searches
in public schools in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The Court will still engage in a
balancing test; however, the unique context of the public school and the government's
responsibilities as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care will be given great weight in
the balancing equation. It appears that the Court will defer to the judgment of school boards and
concerned parents when addressing school search issues. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397. This assertion
is based upon the Court's finding that the Acton case presented an "insufficient basis to contradict
the judgment of Vernonia's parents, its school board, and the District Court, as to what was
reasonably in the interest of these children under the circumstances." Id. See supra notes 174-94
and accompanying text for a discussion of the New Jersey v. T.L. 0. public school search standard.
347. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. The Court characterized the school's interest in deterring drug
use as important, perhaps compelling. Id. at 2395. The school's interest in deterring drug use was
determined to be at least as important as the government's concern regarding law enforcement in
Von Raab. Id. The Court also noted the high risk of harm associated with mixing drugs and athletic
participation. Id. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text (discussing the health and safety
risks associated with the combination of drugs and sports).
Addressing the immediacy of the school's concerns, the Court would not question the district
court's finding that an immediate crisis fueled by student drug use had invaded the school. Acton,
115 S. Ct. at 2395. In fact, Justice Scalia commented that the immediate drug crisis in the Vernonia
schools was of greater proportions than the crisis that existed in Skinner, where the Court upheld
suspicionless drug testing of railroad employees "without proof that a problem existed on the
particular railroads whose employees were subject to the test." Id. "And of much greater
proportions than existed in Von Raab, where there was no documented history of drug use by any
customs officials." Id.
The Actons argued that a suspicion based scheme was a practical, less intrusive alternative to
suspicionless testing. Id. However, the Court "refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive'
search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. The Court concluded that
a suspicion based testing scheme would be worse than suspicionless testing in the public school
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Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for dispensing with the
individualized suspicion requirement on policy grounds." She argued that, a
blanket search was not permissible just because the possibility students would
arbitrarily be chosen for testing was eliminated and the accusatory nature of the
search was diluted.4 9 Rather, Justice O'Connor pointed to the history of the
Fourth Amendment to argue that "mass, suspicionless searches have been
generally considered per se unreasonable . . ..3"o Only in situations where
it was clear that a suspicion based scheme would not be effective had the Court
allowed mass, suspicionless searches.35 Evenhanded treatment is no substitute
for individualized suspicion because it does not afford the subject of the search
any control over whether they will be searched.352 Justice O'Connor asserted
that the "[p]rotection of privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now the
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. 35
3
Justice O'Connor believed that a suspicion based testing program "would
have gone a long way toward solving Vernonia's school drug problem while
preserving the Fourth Amendment rights of James Acton and others like
him."" The fact that most of the evidence of student drug use would have
allowed a search under the T.L.O. standard was the great irony of the case
according to Justice O'Connor.355  In sum, Justice O'Connor concluded that
suspicionless testing was not justified on the facts in this case.35 6
environment. Id. The Court reasoned that a suspicion based scheme would transform the testing
process into a badge of shame for those students accused of drug use, generate the expense of
defending lawsuits, and add to the ever expanding duty of teachers the responsibility to detect drug
use. Id. The Court did not want to threaten the teacher-student relationship by imposing this
adversarial duty on teachers. Id.
348. Id. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
349. Id.
350. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2398 (1995).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 2397-98. A suspicion based scheme allows a person to avoid a search by not acting
in a suspicious manner. Id. at 2397.
353. Id. at 2399. "Mhe individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as
the Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the name of policy concerns."
Id. at 2402.
354. Id. at 2403-04. Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for failing to seriously discuss
the practicality of a suspicion based requirement. Id. at 2403. This lack of discussion was crucial
according to Justice O'Connor because "nowhere is it less clear that an individualized suspicion
requirement would be ineffectual than in the school context." Id.
355. Id.
356. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2403 (1995). Even if Justice
O'Connor agreed that the drug testing policy was reasonable, she pointed out two additional flaws
in the program. Id. at 2406. First, she pointed out that virtually no evidence existed in the record
documenting a drug problem in the particular school James Acton attended. Id. All of the reported
incidents of drug use centered around the high school. Id. The only evidence of a drug problem
in James' elementary school, which included the 7th and 8th grades, was a single assertion by the
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Justice Ginsburg specifically set out the issue addressed in this Note: the
scope of the Acton decision.3"7 The Court clearly held that drug testing
student athletes may be constitutionally permissible in circumstances where a
compelling need to test is demonstrated358 and certain procedures are followed
to ensure that students' privacy interests will be protected.35 9 However, the
decision did not assume that suspicionless drug testing is permissible in other
contexts.' The following Section of this Note discusses whether Acton can
reasonably be extended to allow suspicionless drug testing of other students
outside the context of athletics."6
IV. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING A DRUG TESTING POLICY
A court will ultimately decide the constitutionality of a drug testing policy
by utilizing a balancing test. The students' privacy interests will be weighed
against the school's asserted need to test. The result of this balancing test will
depend upon the weight and significance the court places upon the various
competing interests.
The courts that have upheld suspicionless student drug testing find that the
balance weighs in favor of the government, trumping the students' privacy
interests. In Schaill and Acton, the courts decided that mandatory, suspicionless
drug testing of student athletes was not an unreasonable search. These two
courts reasoned that because student athletes' expectations of privacy are even
school principal that the problems did not start at the high school level, they started in the
elementary school. Id. Next, Justice O'Connor stated that the school's decision to single out student
athletes for testing was unreasonable. Id. This choice was unreasonable because, in her opinion,
the true driving force behind the drug testing program was to restore order and discipline in the
classroom, not prevent athletic injuries. Id. In conclusion, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[i]t cannot
be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis."
Id. at 2407. The problem of drug use in American public schools cannot be ignored, yet Justice
Jackson's famous words must also not be forgotten, "[t]hat [schools] are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes." West Virgina State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943).
357. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg addressed the
scope of the Court's decision stating, "I comprehend the Court's opinion as reserving the question
whether the [Vernonia School] District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally
could impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others in team sports,
but on all students required to attend school." Id.
358. See supra notes 326-47 and accompanying text.
359. See infra section IV.B (setting out the specific guidelines that should be followed to
implement a drug testing policy).
360. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. The majority also "caution[ed] against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts." Id.
361. See infra section V.A.
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lower than the general population of students, suspicionless drug testing was
reasonable.' How this balancing test will be applied to other segments of the
student population, other than athletes, remains to be seen.
A. Expanding Drug Testing Outside of Athletics
In Acton, the Court expanded the special needs exception to the traditional
warrant and probable cause requirements which the Skinner and Von Raab
Courts relied upon. By upholding the drug testing policy in Acton, the Court
no longer required a showing of extraordinary safety and national security
hazards before justifying a suspicionless search. Rather, the Court asked
whether the search was reasonable given the responsibilities schools have to
provide an appropriate learning environment. This expansion of the special
needs exception has cracked open the door to permit suspicionless drug testing.
How wide is that crack is the question that remains unanswered.
At one end of the drug testing spectrum is a blanket program requiring all
students attending public school to submit to random, suspicionless drug testing.
While such a program would eliminate any allegation that a school singled out
one particular group for testing, such a scheme would not pass a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test.' While school attendance is compulsory,
just being required to attend school does not significantly diminish a student's
reasonable expectations of privacy.' The Supreme Court conceded this point
362. These courts stated that the student athletes' expectations of privacy were diminished
because of communal undress, preseason physical examinations, and rules that student athletes must
accept as conditions to participating in organized sports. See supra notes 245-347 and accompanying
text.
363. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). In her concurrence in Acton, Justice Ginsburg explicitly reserved the question of
whether a school wide testing scheme would be constitutional. Id. See also Odenheim v. Carlstadt-
E. Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Chancery Div. 1985) (invalidating
a drug testing program requiring every student enrolled in school to submit to annual urinalysis).
364. An interesting hypothetical situation that might pass the test set out in Acton to permit
testing a substantial number of students is a requirement that all students in physical education class
must submit to drug testing. One of the pervasive factors the Acton Court focused its analysis on
when it balanced the athletes' expectations of privacy against the school's interest in testing was the
athletes' diminished expectations of privacy. The same elements of communal undress the Court
noted in Acton are present when a student changes before and after physical education class and also
when showering after class. While the student in physical education class does not voluntarily
submit to the numerous training rules incident to participating in athletics, the Court appeared to
weigh this factor as only secondary to the element of communal undress it chose to focus upon. See
supra note 334.
Additionally, if such a testing program were challenged, the affected students would have a
strong argument that because they did not voluntarily subject themselves to a higher degree of
regulation their expectations of privacy have not been diminished. The Court noted that because
student athletes, just as employees in a closely regulated industry, voluntarily subject themselves to
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in New Jersey v. T.L.O.' Even given the expansion of the special needs
exception,' a school district would be hard pressed to identify a compelling
need to test every student.36 7 Such a comprehensive testing scheme would also
be subject to an attack that less intrusive means could sufficiently serve the
school's desired end.
At the other end of the drug testing spectrum are programs that test a
specific group within the school population, namely athletes. After Acton, such
a program is constitutional if a specific drug problem is identified and certain
procedural safeguards are followed.' The more difficult determinations
regarding the permissible scope of drug testing are those programs that lie in the
middle of this spectrum. School districts across the country are contemplating
expanding drug testing programs to include students participating in
extracurricular activities besides athletics.'
A broad reading of Acton appears to allow the testing of other student
groups besides athletes. Following the reasonableness standard set out in Acton,
no reason exists why specific findings that a pervasive drug problem among the
members of a school's dance team, band, or drama club would not permit
suspicionless testing of these students. While the element of communal undress
may not be as pervasive in each of these situations, such an element does exist.
The students in each of these groups wear uniforms or costumes which they
must change into or out of at some time. In the drama club situation students
would typically change costumes backstage between acts during a performance.
It is doubtful that each of these students has a private dressing room. Thus, an
element of communal undress exists in these groups. Additionally, just as
participation in athletics carries with it prestige and admiration in the school
community that place student athletes in positions of leadership, so does
participation in these groups. Finally, these students also voluntarily consent to
rules and regulations governing their conduct to a greater extent than those
imposed on students generally. Thus, many of the same factors the Court
identified in Acton to determine that student athletes have diminished
expectations of privacy can also be satisfied when analyzing the subjective
expectations of the students participating in other extracurricular activities.
a higher degree of regulation, their expectations of privacy are diminished. See supra note 335.
This is not the case for the student in physical education class. Just as compulsory attendance laws
require students to attend school, state curriculum requirements mandate that a student take a certain
number of physical education classes to meet graduation requirements.
365. See supra notes 174-94 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey v. T.L.O.).
366. See supra section II.C.
367. Such a compelling need might be reached if an extremely high incidence of drug use in
a particular school could be documented. See supra note 317.
368. See supra section Ill.C.2.
369. See supra note 23.
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The school's asserted interest in protecting its students and providing an
educational environment conducive to learning does not change when drug
testing programs are expanded outside the context of athletics. The school's
substantial interest in protecting students who choose to participate in other
extracurricular activities from the dangers of drug use is just as important as
protecting student athletes from the same dangers. The only factor that appears
to be missing to distinguish drug testing between athletic and non-athletic
extracurricular activities is the enhanced physical risks that drug use imposes on
athletes. 3 ° Other than this factor, no distinctions between the school's interest
in protecting all its students from the harmful effects of drugs and only
protecting its student athletes surface. The school's overriding interest in
providing an appropriate learning environment further lessens any distinction that
could be drawn.
Thus, school boards may constitutionally expand drug testing policies
outside the context of athletics. However, expansion does not come without its
price. Because the Supreme Court only addressed drug testing in the context of
athletics, much room exists for students affected by expanded drug testing
policies to argue that Acton can be distinguished from their particular situation.
Therefore, a school board must be careful when determining whether a drug
testing policy is in the best interests of all those involved.3"' The following
guidelines will assist school boards in making these sensitive decisions. To
determine whether a drug testing policy will meet the Supreme Court's school
search standard, a variety of competing interests must be balanced.3" The
following guidelines will balance these interests.
370. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
371. The fiscal crunch many school districts face today may drive the decision that textbooks
and school supplies should be purchased rather than attorney's fees that must be paid when litigation
over a proposed drug testing program must be defended. The Acton litigation is illustrative. The
case cost the school district about $350,000. Special Report: Vernonia Drug Testing, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Feb. 12, 1997, at B1.
Schools must also consider the cost of a drug testing program. The cost of drug tests vary.
See, eg., Bricking, supra note 13, atC1 (reporting that tests for marijuana cost between $10 and $20
and as much as $110 for steroid testing); Rhonda Stansberry, Public to Have Say on Steroid Test,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 31, 1995, at 35 (reporting quotes that one lab charges $135 per test
for steroids and another lab charges $51 per test).
372. See Eugene C. Bjoklun, Drug Testing High School Athletes and the Fourth Amendment,
83 WEsT EDUC. L. REP. 913 (1993) (stating that the criteria courts balance are: compelling need,
limited scope/achievable goals, less intrusive alternatives, diminished expectations of privacy,
limitations on officials' discretion, and criminal/other penalties).
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B. Drug Testing Guidelines
Section (1): An Ideal Drug Testing Program
§ 1.1 Voluntary Drug Testing
A voluntary drug testing program based on a reward system is the ideal
program. Students would not be required to submit to random,
suspicionless drug testing; rather, drug testing would be conducted on a
voluntary basis. Students would be rewarded for participating in the
program and testing drug free over specified periods of time.
Commentary: Voluntary drug testing avoids any Fourth Amendment
implications. It also provides an effective means for students to develop self-
respect. The reward system and positive peer pressure would provide the
incentives for students to participate. Membership in a reward system also
provides an easy excuse for students to avoid experimenting with drugs and
alcohol when they feel negative peer pressure. 3  Many schools currently
operate voluntary testing schemes based on a reward system.3 74 However, a
voluntary system may not be as effective as mandatory testing in solving a more
serious drug problem.375 Thus, the following guidelines are intended to be
consulted by school districts that have decided a stronger response is necessary
to alleviate the specific drug problems in their districts.
373. Jonathan Martin, Testing Clean for Drugs Earns Students Many Rewards, SPOKESMAN
REV., Feb. 6, 1997, at N6 (reporting a high school sophomore's reliance on membership in a drug
free youth program as "an easy way to say no" to peer pressure to drink or smoke).
374. See, eg., Alicia Doyle, Simi Tailors Substance-Abuse Program to Young Pupils, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 5, 1996, at SVI (explaining that positive peer pressure has made voluntary drug
testing programs in California high schools successful); Ray McCaffrey, Drug-Free Kids Take a
Different 7ype of Test, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETrE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 1996, at BI (describing a
voluntary drug testing program in which students receive a membership card good for discounts at
participating businesses); Michelle Barbercheck, Over Half of Students Opt for Drug Tests,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 11, 1995, at BI (reporting that about 64% of Noblesville High School
students volunteered to random drug testing enticed by incentives such as being able to eat lunch off
campus and chances to win trips to Walt Disney World and the Bahamas); Justin Bachman, Schools
in No Rush to Start Drug Tests on Their Students, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Nov. 1, 1995, at
17 (listing schools that offer voluntary drug testing programs); Dave McKibben, Between Privacy
and Playing Clean, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at 1 (same).
375. See supra text accompanying note 274.
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Section (2): Development Guidelines
§ 2.1 Drug Education and Prevention Efforts
School boards should include special drug education classes in their
curriculum, invite guest speakers, and sponsor presentations as preventive
means to curb drug use before implementing a mandatory drug testing
policy. -
Commentary: These efforts will satisfy the less intrusive means
requirement.376 If a drug testing policy is the first attempt a school makes to
solve a drug problem, a court is more likely to strike it down. When previous
efforts have been unsuccessful, a court is more likely to conclude that drug
testing was simply the next logical step in the school's attempt to solve a serious
problem.377
§ 2.2 Specific Problem Identification
School boards must identify a specific drug problem within the group of
students who will be tested. This specific problem should be identified and
recorded in the preamble or introduction of the written drug testing policy.
Commentary: Identifying a specific drug problem is an essential
requirement to substantiate the legitimacy of a drug testing program. 378 A
reviewing court will be looking for a special need to justify the departure from
the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements to allow suspicionless
testing.379 Identifying a specific problem will satisfy the special need to allow
suspicionless testing.'
§ 2.3 Specific Goals
The goals for the drug testing policy must be specific and clear. The goals
must be the protection of the health and safety of the students and the
promotion of a proper learning environment, not a disguised means of
securing law enforcement.
376. See supra notes 269-75 and accompanying text. But see supra note 347 (noting that the
Acton Court "refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment").
377. See supra note 311.
378. See supra notes 269-75, 309-17, 341-47 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 269-75, 309-17, 341-47 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 269-75, 309-17, 341-47 and accompanying text.
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Commentary: A reviewing court is not likely to find that a generalized goal
of reducing student drug use is a compelling reason to mandate that students
submit to testing. 31' Rather, after identifying a specific problem and setting
goals to reduce the problem, a court is more likely to consider a drug testing
program reasonable. 3 2 The drug testing policy must not be used as a method
for criminal investigation. 31 The special needs exception developed through
the administrative search cases applies to non-criminal searches. 3" In the
criminal context, courts are required to adhere to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant and probable cause requirements. 3u
Section (3): Implementation Guidelines
§ 3.1 Student and Parental Consent
The school board must require the student and his or her parent or legal
guardian to sign a consent form prior to testing. The consent form should
only provide authorization to test the student for controlled substances and
performance enhancing drugs.
Commentary: A consent form will serve numerous functions. The student
and his or her parent or legal guardian will receive adequate notice of the drug
testing procedures. 3" An informative packet of materials describing the drug
testing procedures, the consequences of a violation, a list of the specific
substances the student will be tested for, and a consent form should be
compiled. The school board should then distribute this packet of information
well before the beginning of an extracurricular activity. This information will
satisfy the procedural due process requirement that mandates adequate notice of
the testing procedures be given.3
§ 3.2 Selection Methods
School officials should randomly select students to be tested. The selection
criteria must specifically set out how the students will be selected, the
frequency of the tests, and the substances the laboratory will be instructed
to detect. This selection criteria should be published and made available
for the student and his or her parent or legal guardian to review.
381. See supra notes 269-75, 309-17, 341-47 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 269-75, 309-17, 341-47 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 282-84, 340 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 85-173 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 85-173 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
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Commentary: Random selection will ensure that the students selected to be
tested are not arbitrarily chosen.3 a Published selection criteria will provide
notice and limit the school's discretion to select students for testing. 319
Limiting the school's discretion to search is a fundamental requirement. 31
The school must adequately limit the searching administrator's discretion to
prevent students from being subjected to arbitrary searches, or searches meant
to harass or embarrass. 39' A clearly defined testing scheme will adequately
safeguard against this possibility. 31 Disclosure of the selection criteria will
also eliminate any element of surprise when a particular student is selected for
testing.3' The students will be able to assure themselves that their selection
for testing was accomplished in a fair and impartial manner. 31 Disclosing the
substances that will specifically be tested will ensure that private medical facts,
such as whether a student is pregnant or has diabetes, will not be
discovered. 395
§ 3.3 Testing Procedures
An adult monitor of the same sex as the student to be tested should oversee
the collection of the urine sample. The monitor will provide the student
with a specimen control form and an empty specimen bottle. The monitor
may accompany the student into the area where the sample will be
produced. The student should be permitted to produce the sample in an
enclosed stall. Direct observation of the student while producing the
sample should not be permitted. To ensure that the student does not tamper
with the sample the water in the toilet should be tinted and the monitor
should check the sample's temperature. The monitor should then seal the
sample and the student should sign and date the seal before the sample is
sent to a laboratory.
Commentary: These testing procedures minimize the intrusive nature
surrounding the collection and testing of urine. 3' The student should be
monitored to prevent tampering, yet the student's privacy must be protected. 3 7
Allowing the student to produce the sample in an enclosed stall will protect the
388. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 276-81, 339-40 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 77, 133, 205-08, 337-38 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 77, 133, 205-08, 337-38 and accompanying text.
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student's legitimate privacy concerns surrounding the excretory function."
This added privacy measure will not sacrifice the integrity of the testing
system. 3" The monitor may listen for the normal sounds of urination and tint
the water in the toilets to prevent students from tampering with the samples."
While the Supreme Court upheld a testing scheme that permitted observation of
the student while urinating, this practice is not recommended."' The school
board must remember that a court is going to balance the student's privacy
interests against the school's interest in testing. No reason exists to give a court
more factors that weigh in favor of the student's privacy interests when adequate
measures to ensure the integrity of the sample are available.
§ 3.4 Reliable Testing Methods
The test itself must be reliable. An independent certified testing laboratory
should be used, and a method of confirming a positive test result should be
available. Confirmation of an initial positive test may be satisfied through
either another more reliable test such as the gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry testing method, or requiring the student to submit another
sample for testing. The students should be given the option to have the
remaining portion of their samples tested at an independent laboratory of
their choice at their own expense. The student should also send any private
medical information such as current prescription medications that may
produce a false positive directly to the laboratory with the specimen control
form.
Commentary: Procedural due process requires fundamental fairness in drug
testing procedures. Reliable drug testing methods will satisfy this
fundamental fairness requirement.' One of the problems with drug testing
is that a student must reveal private medical facts to explain a false positive test
result.' At the minimum, an opportunity to explain any false positive due
to prescription or over-the-counter medication should be provided.'
However, this requires the student to reveal his or her medical condition to
school officials. This problem is solved by requiring the student to disclose
private medical information directly to the testing laboratory with the urine
sample. 406
398. See supra notes 77, 133, 205-08, 337-38 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 205-08, 337-38 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 205-08, 337-38 and accompanying text.
401. See supra text accompanying note 207.
402. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 133, 339-40.
405. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 340.
Massmann: Drug Testing High School and Junior High School Students After Ve
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997
784 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 31
Section (4): Post-Testing Guidelines
§ 4.1 Appeal Process
The student must be given an opportunity to appeal the finding of a positive
test result. A school board should form a committee to hear student
appeals. The student should be able to introduce evidence or provide an
explanation for the positive result before sanctions are imposed.
Commentary: In public schools procedural due process requires that a
student is provided a rudimentary hearing before a suspension from school for
less than ten days.' While it is not clear exactly what procedures must be
taken before a student is suspended from an extracurricular activity, an appeal
process is strongly suggested.' The appeal process will give the student an
opportunity to be heard to rebut a positive result.' These measures will
ensure that the student's due process rights are satisfied.4"'
§ 4.2 Sanctions
The only sanction the school board should authorize for a positive test
result is suspension from extracurricular activities. Neither academic nor
penal sanctions should be imposed. The sanctions for subsequent positive
test results should be progressive. A counseling program should also be
offered to mitigate the suspension period.
Commentary: The sanctions imposed must only suspend the students from
the extracurricular activities in which they were participating." Because
participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege, and not a right, a
sanction that merely suspends the student from participating in such an activity
is reasonable." 2 Academic or criminal sanctions for a positive result would
not be reasonable. 1 3 The drug testing policy must not be used as a method
for criminal investigation. Progressive sanctions coupled with a counseling
program demonstrate the school's interest in helping, not punishing, students to
avoid the dangers of drug use.
407. See supra note 288.
408. See supra note 287.
409. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 282-84, 340 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 282-84, 340 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 282-84, 340 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [1997], Art. 25
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss2/25
1997] STUDENT DRUG TESTING GUIDELINES 785
§ 4.3 Preserving Anonymity
Access to the students' records should be limited to those school officials
whose duty it is to implement the drug testing program. Written consent
from the student and his or her parent or legal guardian should be obtained
before the records are disclosed to any other party. The records of the
students who are tested should only be kept for one year after the student
has transferred or graduated from the school.
Commentary: This practice will effectively preserve the anonymity of the
student who tests positive, and the confidentiality of the student's records." 4
The purpose of a drug testing program in public schools is to protect the health
and safety of the students, and provide a proper educational environment; not
to single out or make examples of students who have used drugs. The goal is
to help these students and teach them the many problems substance abuse can
cause.4"' Thus, no reason exists to disclose or keep a student's records if the
true goal of the drug testing program is to educate and assist the student in
becoming a healthy and productive citizen.
V. CONCLUSION
The prevalence of drug use in society creates many problems. In public
schools drugs adversely affect the learning environment in many ways: discipline
cannot be maintained, achievement test scores plummet, more students drop out,
and violence increases. No one will disagree that every effort should be made
to decrease the use of drugs among American youth in public schools.
However, school districts must also remember that they are educating American
citizens who enjoy many constitutional freedoms. These freedoms must not be
unduly compromised.
This Note discussed the unique setting of interscholastic sports in which the
case has been made that a special need may exist to allow suspicionless drug
testing as a means to decrease drug use. It is not clear whether or not such a
special need exists to test other segments of the public school population. This
Note provides school districts a set of guidelines to follow if they decide such
a special need exists to test students outside the context of athletics. If these
guidelines are followed, students' privacy interests will be adequately protected
while allowing school districts to take the action they decide is necessary to
resolve a recognized drug problem.
Andrew P. Massrnann
414. See supra note 213.
415. See supra notes 15-16, 230-33.
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